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RECONSTRUCTING THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
DOCTRINE
BRANNON P. DENNING*
ABSTRACT
In this Article, I argue that the alleged incoherence and unpredict-
ability of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine (DCCD) is rooted
in the Supreme Court's search, through the years, for a stable set of
rules enabling it to distinguish permissible from impermissible state
regulations of interstate commerce and commercial actors. Its lack of
success, the Article argues, is due in large part to the Court's inability
to settle on the constitutional command the doctrine was to enforce.
Historically, the Court would promulgate a set of rules, apply them
for a time, then alter or modify them as the rules became unsatisfac-
tory.
Recent cases with similar facts, yet producing different results,
suggest that the superficial stability the Court has achieved with the
DCCD in recent years is largely an illusion. Both the "antidiscrimi-
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nation principle"and the so-called 'Pike balancing"-each represent-
ing one of the two tiers in the Court's standard of review--are
experiencing the same decline and decay as prior rules regimes.
Recent cases suggest that the Court appears poised once again to
alter the DCCD but is proceeding in an undertheorized, ad hoc
manner.
Using the "constitutional decision rules" model of constitutional
interpretation developed by Mitchell Berman, and influenced by
doctrinal theorists like Richard Fallon and Kermit Roosevelt, I argue
that the DCCD could be improved by settling on a "constitutional
operative proposition" rooted in the text and history of the Constitu-
tion and the Commerce Clause, and devising "decision rules" that
would implement that constitutional command.
I conclude that the Framers centralized commercial regulation to
prevent state regulations of interstate commerce likely to produce
friction among states, incite retaliation, and undermine political
union. I specifically reject any attempt to impute a free-trade ideology
to the Framers. Decision rules enforcing the DCCD should, therefore,
go no further than addressing the sorts of "discrimination" that
produce this union-undermining effect. In particular, I would have
the Court discard the "balancing" of burdens and benefits flowing
from truly nondiscriminatory state and local laws. Applying the
reconstructed decision rules to several difficult doctrinal areas, I
argue, results in either a more satisfactory explanation for actions
the Court has taken, or shows more clearly how the Court has
incorrectly resolved particular issues.
[Vol. 50:417
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[N]ot only does the judicial history of the Commerce Clause
show cyclical fluctuations, such as the long look will generally
reveal in the Court's work, but that, in the shorter view, there is
more confusion than in other areas. Lines of cases emerge, have
their progeny and come to arid ends; and rules, formulas, and
labels, to whose comfortable coherence judges unceasingly try to
escape from the distress of disconnected judgments, have short
lives, and if not abandoned, are soon gutted of meaning.
-Alexander M. Bickel1
INTRODUCTION
In some form, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine (DCCD)
has been a feature of American constitutional law for nearly two
centuries.2 Though it has undergone significant doctrinal evolution
over the years,3 the central premise-that the centralization of
commercial regulatory authority in Congress implied judicially
enforceable restraints on the states' regulation of interstate
commerce 4 -has remained constant. Despite the Court's historic
trouble stating and applying the DCCD, the current "rules"
governing DCCD cases have remained relatively stable since the
1970s.
Black-letter law, in fact, could not be more clear. For non-tax
regulations, the Court applies a two-tiered standard of review.5 For
those state or local laws that "discriminate," on their face or in their
purposes or effects, against interstate commerce or interstate
commercial actors, strict scrutiny applies, requiring the government
1. ALEXANDERM. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OFMR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 100-01
(1957).
2. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 188-89 (1824) (interpreting the scope of the
Commerce Clause and the extent of its restraint on states for the first time); Norman R.
Williams, Gibbons, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398, 1398 (2004).
3. See infra Part II.
4. See, e.g., Stephen K. Schutte, Comment, Doctrinal Foundations of Section 1983 and
the Resurgent Dormant Commerce Clause, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1249 (1992).
5. See infra Part III.B.
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to demonstrate a legitimate (i.e., non-protectionist) purpose for the
law, and that there are no less discriminatory means to effectuate
that interest.6 It is a test that is nearly always fatal in fact.' For
nondiscriminatory measures that nevertheless burden interstate
commerce, a deferential balancing test is employed: to prevail, the
challenger must demonstrate that the burdens on interstate
commerce are "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits."'
These rules are easy to recite, but their application is notoriously
difficult, resulting in cases with similar facts being decided differ-
ently, and the different outcomes justified on the basis of tenden-
tious distinctions.9 A great deal of scholarship on the DCCD has
sought to unify many of these divergent opinions with grand
theories of the DCCD promising to reconcile apparently irreconcil-
able results."° While I propose my own grand theory of the DCCD in
6. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005).
7. But see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (refusing to invalidate state ban on
import ofbaitfish, holding instead that preventing parasitic infection of native fish stocks was
a legitimate purpose, and that no less discriminatory means were available to screen infected
baitfish from healthy ones).
8. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The test is now known
eponymously as the "Pike balancing" test, though balancing was employed by the Court prior
to Pike. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1945).
9. See infra Part III.
10. For some of the major studies, see Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a
Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43 (1988); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant
Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More
Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoLY 395 (1998); Saul Levmore,
Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563 (1983); Donald H. Regan,
The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause,
84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986); Robert A. Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a
Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional
Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 885 (1985); Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend: A Game
Theoretical Analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1
(2003); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 125;
Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship"and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (1981);
Norman R. Williams, The American Common Market (Oct. 15, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=92431 1.
For general treatments, see BORIS I. BITTKER, BITIKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE §§ 6.01-6.08 (1999 & Supp. 2008); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 419-66 (3d ed. 2006); DAN T. COENEN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 209-342 (2004); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-1 to 6-27 (3d ed. 2000).
Dan Coenen has written important articles illuminating particular aspects of the DCCD.
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this Article, I do it from the top down, instead of from the bottom up.
In other words, I concede that a number of the Court's DCCD cases
are, in fact, impossible to reconcile, suggesting that something is
amiss in the Court's formulation of the doctrine, its application of it,
or both.
I propose here to reconstruct the DCCD along a "decision rules"
model. As explained in an important article by Mitchell Berman, 11
the creation of constitutional doctrine is best understood as
consisting of two distinct operations. The first involves identifying
the "constitutional operative proposition[ ]," that is, what the text of
the Constitution requires. 2 At the second step, the Court creates
"decision rules" that implement that constitutional directive. 3
Building on Berman's insights, Kermit Roosevelt has used the
model to identify pathologies in constitutional doctrine that often
result from a conflation of doctrinal rules with constitutional
operative propositions, where the rules are seen as ends instead of
means.'4 As I argue below, the DCCD is currently showing signs of
just this sort of "calcification," to use Roosevelt's term.
Part I briefly sketches the decision rules model of interpretation
and Roosevelt's theory of calcification. Part II is a historical review
of the DCCD; its thesis is that the Court wrestled with the question
of which decision rules to adopt throughout the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Only in the second half of the twentieth
See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE
L.J. 965 (1998) [hereinafter Coenen, Business Subsidies]; Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the
Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395 (1989).
For extensive examination of the DCCD's application to state and local taxes, see generally
JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION §§ 4.01-4.24 (3d ed. 1998
& Supp. 2007).
Important critiques of the DCCD include Eule, supra, Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed
Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1191 (1998), Martin H.
Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance
of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569. See also Edward A. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the
Commerce Clause: The Case for Abandoning the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition of
Discriminatory Taxation, 29 OHiO N.U. L. REV. 29 (2002) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Restoring
Politics].
11. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004).
12. Id. at 15.
13. Id.
14. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the
Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2005).
2008] 423
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century did its decision rules for non-tax cases stabilize.15 In Part
III, I argue that the stability is now eroding; the DCCD is showing
signs of calcification, resulting in, among other things, a conflation
of decision rules with constitutional commands. This calcification,
as well as the historic difficulty the Court has had maintaining
stable decision rules for the DCCD, can be traced to the Court's
historic failure to articulate an adequate constitutional operative
proposition for the DCCD.
Part IV then supplies what the Court has not-at least not
consistently: an operative proposition with firm historical and
textual foundations. The best foundation for the DCCD is rooted in
the Framers' desire to prevent the political instability that resulted
from economic rivalries among the states during the Confederation
period. Further, Part IV proposes a set of decision rules implement-
ing that proposition. Finally, in Part V, I apply the new decision
rules to recent controversies involving the DCCD. A brief conclusion
follows.
I. THE DECISION RULES MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: AN OVERVIEW
Professor Mitchell Berman has argued that constitutional
doctrine is created through a two-step process.16 First, the reviewing
court must establish constitutional meaning by adopting a "consti-
tutional operative proposition[]."17 In the next step, the court
creates "constitutional decision rules Oudicial statements of how
courts should decide whether the operative propositions have been
complied with)."18 The choice of decision rules is important because
the Court always has a choice in their fashioning, and its choice can
shape the content of the norm itself.19
15. This is an important and necessary qualification. The current DCCD rules for tax
cases dates only to Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), though
Complete Auto synthesized and restated earlier doctrine. While some discussion of tax cases
is necessary to tell the story I tell here, and while I think that the decision rules model has
explanatory power vis-A-vis the Court's development of its tax jurisprudence, I will largely
confine my analysis to non-tax regulations.
16. See Berman, supra note 11, at 15.
17. Id.
18. Id.; see also id. at 57-58.
19. See Roosevelt, supra note 14, at 1655-56 ("The insight of the decision rules model
49A [Vol. 50:417
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A. Identifying the Constitutional Operative Proposition
The first step in the process is the one that has traditionally
received the most focus in constitutional theory: judicial determina-
tion of constitutional meaning. Not surprisingly, since his focus is
elsewhere, Professor Berman does not spend much time on this step,
other than to note that in performing it, "the courts may rely on any
number of interpretive considerations, including such 'modalities'
as text, history, precedent, structure, moral judgment and the
like."2 Though opinions differ as to which, if any, of the modalities
should drive the Court's decisions,21 there is general agreement that
appeals to the modalities Berman mentions are at least legitimate
forms that arguments about constitutional meaning can take.22
B. Crafting Decision Rules and Constitutional "Calcification"
The theoretical purchase of a decision rules model23 is its claim
that the traditional accounts of constitutional interpretation that
focus only on fixing constitutional meaning are incomplete.24
Because constitutional norms, even once defined, have to be ap-
is ... that the Court intentionally crafts decision rules that depart, in some cases quite
substantially, from its understanding of constitutional operative propositions. The Court
prescribes doctrinal rules that predictably lead to adjudicative outcomes that are erroneous
in terms of its understanding of the actual meaning of the Constitution."). Dan Coenen, too,
has written thoughtfully about doctrinal rules designed to facilitate the application of
constitutional norms. See Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting
Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. &MARYL. REV.
1575 (2001) [hereinafter Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration]; Dan T. Coenen, The
Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1281 (2002).
20. Berman, supra note 11, at 9. The reference to "modalities" alludes to Philip Bobbitt's
work. See PHILIP BOBBIrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 6-8 (1982);
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991).
21. For an effort to develop a theory about how the various modalities should be weighed,
see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,
100 HARv. L. REV. 1189 (1987).
22. My own views are discussed infra during the larger discussion of the constitutional
operative proposition for the DCCD. See infra Part V.A.
23. Though I use the term "decision rules model," I would include Professor Fallon's work
on constitutional implementation in this discussion. Both self-consciously focus on the
creation and application of doctrinal rules to implement constitutional norms. RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 7-12 (2001).
24. See Berman, supra note 11, at 5-9.
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plied to particular fact situations, courts-the Supreme Court in
particular-have to self-consciously and intentionally generate rules
at the point where constitutional norms meet those facts.
First, courts have a choice about how closely the rule should
hew to the constitutional norm it will be enforcing. Should a court
(1) formulate rules that closely track the operative provision, or
(2) craft rules that depart from the operative proposition either by
(a) overprotecting or (b) underenforcing it? After that decision is
made, judges face a second question: what sorts of doctrinal tests
are available, and which should be used?
Professors Berman, Roosevelt, and Fallon have a great deal to say
about what these rules look like and what factors influence courts
when designing them.25 However, I will defer until later a discussion
of the criteria Berman and others develop to assess various decision
rules, as well as a description of common decision rules in American
constitutional law. At this point, I want to introduce Kermit
Roosevelt's fascinating take on the decision rules model.
Roosevelt has observed that constitutional decision rules and
constitutional doctrine do not remain stable over time.26 As doctrine
"decays," it changes, sometimes becoming something quite different
over time as courts attempt to shore it up.2" During these times,
doctrine can become highly unstable and unpredictable." In some
cases, the rules created simply collapse in on the operative proposi-
tion they were supposed to enforce." The disconnect between
constitutional ends and doctrinal means can result in an acoustic
separation between the rules and the outcome of cases.3°
This process of doctrinal decay and collapse was described by
Professor Roosevelt as "constitutional calcification."'" He writes that
"[i]n a striking number of cases the Court has forgotten the reasons
behind particular rules and has come to treat them as nothing more
25. See FALLON, supra note 23, at 47-52; Berman, supra note 11, at 92-96; Roosevelt,
supra note 14, at 1658-67.
26. See Roosevelt, supra note 14, at 1692-93.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. Id.
426 [Vol. 50:417
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than statements of constitutional requirements. 32 Conflating
"judicial doctrine and constitutional command tends to warp
doctrine, frequently at significant cost to constitutional values."33
When this occurs, he argues, it is time to disentangle the decision
rules and the constitutional operative propositions, clarifying the
latter and designing new decision rules that best effectuate those
constitutional norms.34
The history of the DCCD is best understood as a search by the
Court for stable decision rules. And although the Court-finally
-achieved some stability in its decision rules, those rules are
beginning to show signs of the calcification that Roosevelt describes.
That calcification, moreover, has occurred because the Court
adopted decision rules without adopting a well-grounded constitu-
tional operative proposition, or because it incorporated existing
decision rules that implement a now discarded operative proposi-
tion. I will explain and defend these claims in Part III. In the next
Part, however, I show that what looks like an almost promiscuous
fashioning and discarding of doctrinal tests over the years was a
temporally extended search for appropriate decision rules for the
DCCD.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DCCD: A SEARCH FOR DECISION
RULES
The incoherence and inconsistency in the history of the DCCD
reflects the Court's adoption and discard of decision rules, many of
which proved to be unsatisfying means for deciding future cases.
The Court's dissatisfaction stemmed from multiple sources. Often
the decision rules themselves were flawed from the beginning; in
other cases, the rules succumbed to the inevitable decay that
attends doctrinal rules designed under conditions no longer extant.
But imperfect rules are only a part of the story, for in the early
days, the Court attempted to design rules that tracked as closely as
possible the constitutional operative proposition. One of the main
32. Id. at 1652.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 1692, 1720. For the criteria used to fashion decision rules, see infra Part
IV.B.
20081
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difficulties then--one with which the Court still struggles-is the
lack of a satisfactory account of that proposition.
A detailed doctrinal history of the DCCD is at least deserving of
a separate article-if not a book-in itself. Nevertheless, even a
brief tour d'horizon of the DCCD's evolution from the Marshall
Court to Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.35 will show that the Court has
reeled from one set of decision rules to another. Though it finally
achieved a superficial stability and coherence in its DCCD decision
rules, Part III argues that this regime is under considerable strain
and will not likely last much longer in its current form. Recent
cases, moreover, strongly suggest that doctrinal change is already
under way.
A. Origins: The Marshall and Taney Courts
1. The Marshall Court and the DCCD
The Marshall Court decided three cases in which limits on state
power over interstate commerce were implicated.36 Famously, these
three cases, while suggestive of limits on state power absent
congressional action, never actually invalidated a state law on that
ground. In Gibbons v. Ogden, the New York steamboat monopoly
was held to be in conflict with a federal coasting license. 7 In Brown
v. Maryland, federal tariff laws, Marshall argued, constituted a
35. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
36. Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829); Brown v. Maryland,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See generally
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS,
1789-1888, at 168-81 (1985); ROBERT KENNETH FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN
MARSHALL 108-10 (1968); FELIx FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL,
TANEY, AND WAITE 14-23 (1937); CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN
MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 10-11, 146-47, 233 n.76 (1996); SAMUEL J. KONEFSKY, JOHN
MARSHALL AND ALEXANDER HAMILTON: ARCHITECTS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 213,225-
27 (1964); R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT
410 (2001) [hereinafter NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL]; R. KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT
UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 85 (1968) [hereinafter NEWMYER, MARSHALL AND TANEY];
THOMAS REED POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 32,142
(1956); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 485-
86 (abridged ed. 1991); George L. Haskins, John Marshall and the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 34 (1955); Williams, supra note 2, at 1441.
37. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 210.
428 [Vol. 50:417
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license to import, which barred Maryland's imposition of a tax on
importers of foreign goods.3" In Willson, the Court concluded that
the construction of a dam over a navigable waterway was not a
forbidden regulation of interstate commerce, after first concluding
that there was no congressional legislation on the subject (despite
the fact that the plaintiff had a federal coasting license like the one
in Gibbons).3 9
While Gibbons and Brown were preemption cases, Willson
contained the first hint that the Commerce Clause contained
implicit limits on state power. Without explaining why, Marshall
concluded that "the act empowering the Black Bird Creek Marsh
Company to place a dam across the creek[] can[not], under all the
circumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant to the power
to regulate commerce in its dormant state. 4 °
The contending interpretations of the Commerce Clause at the
time were irreconcilable. On the one hand were those who argued
that the Constitution's assignment of power over "commerce among
... the [several] states" was exclusive and that the states were
deprived of such power.41 Marshall admitted in his Gibbons opinion
that "there [wa] s great force in this argument," and that he was "not
satisfied that it ha[d] been refuted. '42 Adopting that position would
have hamstrung state efforts to exercise myriad "police powers," at
least when the subjects of those powers were or could be part of
interstate commerce.43 This would have undoubtedly evoked a
firestorm of protest from states, which were already beginning to be
nervous about the Marshall Court's nationalist decisions.
But the alternative-that states had full concurrent power over
interstate commerce, unless Congress had acted and its acts
conflicted with state law-was equally unpalatable to the author of
38. Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 448-49. Much of Brown turned on an application of the
Import-Export Clause of Article I, Section 10. Id.
39. Willson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 252; see CURRIE, supra note 36, at 175; KONEFSKY, supra
note 36, at 226; WHITE, supra note 36, at 584.
40. Willson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 252.
41. See, e.g., Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 209 (describing the argument of Daniel
Webster, counsel for Gibbons, before the Court).
42. Id.
43. See WHITE, supra note 36, at 580 ("Marshall could hardly gainsay that the states had
some reserved regulatory powers .... He conceded that a variety of state regulatory legislation
would withstand constitutional scrutiny.").
2008] 429
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McCulloch v. Maryland.4 Marshall had held in McCulloch that even
where concurrent power was undisputed, as it was in the area of
taxation, instances of that power's exercise could be so incompatible
with the plan of Union expressed in the Constitution as to render
them unconstitutional.45
Marshall, a judicial politician par excellence, finessed the issue in
Gibbons. First, he denied that states had a concurrent power over
interstate commerce qua commerce as they had concurrent power
to tax.46 While conceding that states may exercise some power over
interstate commerce, he argued that power stemmed from some
other source:
All experience shows, that the same measures, or measures
scarcely distinguishable from each other, may flow from distinct
powers; but this does not prove that the powers themselves are
identical. Although the means used in their execution may
sometimes approach each other so nearly as to be confounded,
there are other situations in which they are sufficiently distinct
to establish their individuality.47
Marshall then located the source of this power in the ability of
states to "regulat[e] their own purely internal affairs, whether of
trading or police,' 4' a power that Congress did not possess. Among
these powers he included "[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, health
laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal
commerce of a State, and those which respect turnpike roads,
ferries, etc. 49
44. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
45. Id. at 435-36.
46. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 199-200 (distinguishing the power to tax from the
power over interstate commerce). Even here, as he made clear in Brown v. Maryland, that
power could not "be used so as to obstruct the free course of a power given to Congress. We
cannot admit, that it may be used so as to obstruct or defeat the power to regulate commerce."
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 448-49 (1827).
47. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 204; see HOBSON, supra note 36, at 142 ("The chief
justice ... recognized the existence of a broad area of reserved state powers known as the
'police power.' At the same time he took great pains to maintain a conceptual distinction
between the police power and the power to regulate commerce.").
48. Id. at 209.
49. Id. at 203-04; see CURRIE, supra note 36, at 174 ("Marshall ... took pains to emphasize
that the states were not without all power to impede interstate or foreign commerce," but
emphasized that the power was not the power to regulate commerce, but rather to exercise
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Looking at these cases through a decision rules model, the
constitutional operative proposition, as Marshall conceived it, was
that the Constitution prohibited state laws attempting to regulate
interstate commerce as commerce-even when Congress had not
acted-while permitting police power regulations that might (as it
would later be put) indirectly regulate interstate commerce."° The
constitutionality of state power, then, turned on the purpose for
which the state exercised it. As for the decision rules, they tracked
the operative proposition; Marshall attempted to enforce it perfectly.
But, as David Currie has observed, Marshall "made no real effort to
explain [the distinction in Willson], though this was the first case in
which he had to face the issue of the preemptive effect of the
commerce clause itself; he left us to wonder what was the basis of
the decision."'"
2. The Taney Court
If, as Kent Newmyer wrote, "[t]he Marshall Court had painted
with broad strokes," then "[t]he new age needed a lighter touch and
more subtle shading."" The Taney Court certainly provided both; in
fact, the shading among the Justices was so subtle that Carl
Swisher, the Taney Court historian, termed the variety of opinions
in one DCCD case a "riot of diversity."53 Professor Currie was more
blunt: prior to Cooley,54 the Taney Court's DCCD opinions "sub-
other police powers); KONEFSKY, supra note 36, at 208-09 (noting the importance of
"Marshall's distinction between the regulation of commerce entrusted to Congress and local
regulations which might have an incidental or 'remote influence' on commerce.").
50. See HOBSON, supra note 36, at 142 ("From [counsels] arguments Marshall fashioned
a unique synthesis that leaned toward exclusive power while recognizing as a practical matter
the states' concurrent power in this area."); WHITE, supra note 36, at 577 ("Marshall seemed
to say ... first, that the states could freely regulate internal commerce; second, that Congress
had exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce; and third, that when Congress did not
choose to exercise its power the states were forbidden from acting."); id. at 583-84
(emphasizing Willson's insistence that exercises of the police power were not impermissible
regulations of interstate commerce).
51. CURRIE, supra note 36, at 176.
52. NEWMYER, MARSHALL AND TANEY, supra note 36, at 101.
53. 5 CARL B. SWISHER, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, at 375 (1974); see also HAROLD
M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 81 (1982).
54. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852).
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merged the unhappy reader in a torrent of verbiage ... without
providing any meaningful guidance for future controversies."55
Still, it is important to remember, as then-Professor Frankfurter
reminded his audience, that 'Taney [did not] accomplish[] a
wholesale reversal of Marshall's doctrines."56 On the contrary,
Marshall's opinions "challenged and confined the creative efforts of
Taney."57 Marshall's framing of the choices for the constitutional
operative proposition-whether the commerce power delegated to
Congress was exclusive or not-was still the starting point for the
Court's discussions. The Justices, further, still sought a rule of
decision that tracked the operative proposition closely.
Taney argued that Marshall's distinction between regulations of
commerce and exercises of the police power was an untenable one,
and rejected the exclusivity theory that clearly had Marshall's
sympathy.58 For Taney, state power over commerce existed side by
side with that of Congress; only in the case of clear conflict between
state and congressional regulation of commerce did state power
have to give way.59 The problem was attracting sufficient numbers
of Justices to that position so that it might become the law. In three
of the four important DCCD cases decided by the Taney Court, so
many Justices spoke for themselves alone that "whether majority or
minority," wrote Swisher, "[t]he opinions ... were so diverse that
attempts to summarize could only confuse."6°
Early Taney Court cases can therefore be described only in terms
of their result, and positions of individual Justices noted. In New
55. CURRIE, supra note 36, at 230.
56. FRANKFURTER, supra note 36, at 49; see also 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT
IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 27 (rev. ed. 1926) (noting that early Taney Court cases, like New
York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837), "did not challenge in any way Marshall's opinion
in Gibbons v. Ogden.... [And they] did not depart from Marshall's broad doctrines on interstate
commerce as far as Marshall himself had gone in Wilson [sic] ....").
57. FRANKFURTER, supra note 36, at 46-47.
58. Id. at 52-53 (explaining that Taney denied Marshall's distinction between regulation
of commerce and permissible exercises of the police power and rejecting propriety of attempts
to inquire into legislative motive); SWISHER, supra note 53, at 373-74.
59. See NEWMYER, MARSHALL AND TANEY, supra note 36, at 103 (noting that "Taney
explicitly repudiated exclusivism and supported the power of states to legislate concurrently
with Congress in the field of interstate commerce," while recognizing congressional primacy
once it had acted).
60. SWISHER, supra note 53, at 388.
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York v. Miln, 1 the Court-with only Justice Story dissenting-
upheld New York's requirement that masters of ships coming from
out-of-state and foreign countries report the names and birth places
of passengers and post bond to ensure passengers would not become
public charges." Justice Barbour, applying Marshall's decision rule,
declared that the New York law was a valid exercise of its police
power and not a regulation of commerce.63 Though Miln "settled
nothing,"64 it did seem an emphatic decision on the part of the Court
not to "close[] the door to state power by opening the one to
exclusivism deliberately left ajar by Marshall's Gibbons opinion."65
Subsequently, the License Cases6 not only settled nothing, but
they actually sowed more confusion. Though the Court unanimously
upheld the right of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Hamp-
shire to regulate the sale of liquor--even liquor imported into the
state in its "original package" 6 -- six Justices wrote nine separate
61. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
62. Id. at 136.
63. Id. at 130-43; CURRIE, supra note 36, at 204 ("[Justice Barbour] wrote for the Court
a relatively straightforward opinion leaving open the question whether Congress possessed
exclusive authority to regulate commerce."); NEWMYER, MARSHALL AND TANEY, supra note 36,
at 102; SWISHER, supra note 53, at 363. Justice Barbour's colleagues complained that his
written opinion exceeded the modest position he advocated in conference, characterizing the
police power as "unqualified and exclusive" and "flatly contradict[ing] the Gibbons opinion,
which gave federal law priority in case of conflict." NEWMYER, MARSHALL AND TANEY, supra
note 36, at 102; see also SWISHER, supra note 53, at 364. Barbour even gratuitously added that
regulation of people could not be a regulation of commerce, Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 142, a
vivid reminder that the question of congressional regulation of slavery and state regulation
of free blacks within their territory lurked like Banquo's Ghost in the background of
antebellum cases involving the commerce power. SWISHER, supra note 53, at 363; see also
HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 53, at 80 ("This background of controversy [over state Negro
Seamen Acts confining to ship or prison free blacks landing in slave state seaports] permeated
the Miln opinion."); SWISHER, supra note 53, at 359 ("Always in the background of judicial
reasoning with respect to these controversies were the issues of slavery.").
64. NEWMYER, MARSHALL AND TANEY, supra note 36, at 103. Professor Currie
characterized Miln as an "easy case" whose decision was amply supported by Marshall's prior
opinions. CURRIE, supra note 36, at 206.
65. NEWMEYER, MARSHALL AND TANEY, supra note 36, at 102.
66. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
67. Id. at 568-70. For a description of the laws themselves, see id. at 504; see also
SWISHER, supra note 53, at 372.
68. See Thurlow, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 535-36. The "original package" doctrine was
Marshall's heuristic device for determining at what point "interstate" commerce lost its
"interstate" quality, thus enabling states to tax those goods. Marshall's solution, put forth in
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827), was that the state's ability to tax kicked
in whenever bulk goods were broken up and commingled with other goods for retail sale. Id.
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opinions giving their reasons. 9 Swisher wrote of those opinions that
"[t]he commentator on the opinions of the six Justices can no more
bring them into harmony than could the Justices themselves."7
Justices McLean and Grier (with Justice Woodbury partially
agreeing) held to Marshall's dichotomy-regulation of commerce/
exercise of the police power-and found the laws to be in the latter
class.71
Chief Justice Taney, joined by Justice Catron, rejected both
exclusivity and Marshall's classification, endorsing the proposition
that Congress and the states had concurrent authority to regulate
interstate commerce as long as Congress had not acted.72 Amid this
confusing throng, which has led commentators to argue that the
License Cases "lack[ed] doctrinal significance,' 7  and were 'less
coheren[t]" than Miln,74 there was only one suggestion of a way out
of the thicket. Justice Woodbury's opinion suggested framing the
issue in a way that presaged the rule adopted in Cooley.75
The Passenger Cases76 continued the unedifying airing of mul-
tiple points of view that were the trademark of the Taney Court's
DCCD opinions. Five Justices voted to strike down New York and
Massachusetts' attempts to tax interstate and foreign passengers
landed at their ports, but "no one spoke for the Court. 77 The
Justices were stalemated over the exclusivity/concurrent power
at 441-42. The original package doctrine was finally abandoned in Michelin Tire Corp. v.
Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1975). See generally Walter Hellerstein, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages:
Enhanced State Power To Tax Imports, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 99.
69. CURRIE, supra note 36, at 225-26; NEWMYER, MARSHALL AND TANEY, supra note 36,
at 103; SWISHER, supra note 53, at 373-74; 2 WARREN, supra note 56, at 154.
70. SWISHER, supra note 53, at 373.
71. CURRIE, supra note 36, at 225; SWISHER, supra note 53, at 374. Justices McLean and
Grier, however, disagreed as to the extent to which the commerce power was exclusive in
Congress. NEWMYER, MARSHALL AND TANEY, supra note 36, at 103; SWISHER, supra note 53,
at 374-75.
72. CURRIE, supra note 36, at 226; NEWMYER, MARSHALL AND TANEY, supra note 36, at
103-04; SWISHER, supra note 53, at 375. Justices Woodbury and Nelson agreed with the Chief
Justice that the distinction between state regulations of commerce as commerce and exercises
of the police power was artificial and untenable. CURIE, supra note 36, at 226.
73. HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 53, at 81.
74. Id. at 81-82; see also id. at 81 ("Out of this plethora of views, no doctrine at all
emerged, and scarcely any result .....)
75. See infra Part II.B; see also SWISHER, supra note 53, at 375; WARREN, supra note 56,
at 238 n.1.
76. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
77. CURRIE, supra note 36, at 227.
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question, with some Justices declining to invoke the Commerce
Clause at all.78 'The upshot," wrote Professor Currie, "was almost
total incoherence. 79
Professor Swisher concluded that "[h]owever great the yearnings
for judicial synthesis after the fashion of that provided for the
Marshall Court, it may be that publicly displayed judicial ferment
had to precede the arrival of such synthesis."8 ° As it happened,
synthesis was at hand; it came like a "bolt out of the blue"8" just a
few years after the Passenger Cases, and from the pen of a rookie
Justice.
B. Cooley's National/Local Test
A Pennsylvania law requiring vessels entering the port of
Philadelphia either to hire a local pilot, or to pay into a fund
established for the relief of retired pilots and their families, was
challenged as a violation of the Commerce Clause.82 Justice
Benjamin Curtis began his opinion in Cooley with a significant
concession: the pilotage law was without a doubt a regulation of
interstate commerce, and thus "appeared ... to reject Marshall's
metaphysical police power distinction altogether."83 But more
importantly, Curtis reframed the issue completely, articulating a
decision rule that focused on the subject of the regulation.'
As Curtis put it, "whatever subjects of this power are in their
nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of
regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require
exclusive legislation by Congress."85 On the other hand, if the nature
of the subject is such that "it is local and not national; that it is
likely to be the best provided for, not by one system, or plan of
regulations, but by as many as the legislative discretion of the
78. Id. at 229.
79. Id. at 229-30.
80. SWISHER, supra note 53, at 377.
81. CURRIE, supra note 36, at 231.
82. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
83. CURRIE, supra note 36, at 231.
84. NEWMYER, MARSHALL AND TANEY, supra note 36, at 105 ("[Curtis] inject[ed] some
constitutional order into its interpretation of the commerce power."); SWISHER, supra note 53,
at 405 ("[Curtis] restate[d] the question.").
85. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319.
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several states should deem applicable to the local peculiarities of the
ports within their limits," then it may be left to the states to
regulate, unless Congress preempted them.86
Despite the fact that "the opinion provides little guidance for
distinguishing" between national and local subjects," Cooley
"devised a rule of thumb to guide the process of decision and thus
gave clarity and some predictability to its efforts.""8 Cooley "began
a new era." 9 If it was "an eloquent statement of indefiniteness,"
that indefiniteness "came to seem in some way manageable" in
contrast to the confusion that preceded it.9"
One of the things that makes Cooley so noteworthy is the fact that
Curtis had crafted an entirely new decision rule that straddled the
diametrically opposed operative propositions held by the Justices.
Only the diehard exclusivists (Justices McLean and Wayne) and the
most extreme states' rights Justice (Daniel) dissented.9 Even Chief
Justice Taney acquiesced in Curtis's compromise. That Cooley
successfully finessed the question of the operative proposition, I
think, accounts for its durability as a decision rule over the years. 92
Vestiges of this rule remain in the Court's current DCCD jurispru-
dence.93 In fact, it would not be too grandiose to employ Alfred North
Whitehead's metaphor and proclaim that all subsequent DCCD
formulae are but a footnote to Cooley. 4
86. Id.
87. SWISHER, supra note 53, at 406 ("It left unanswered the question whether the Court
would find to be local any interstate or foreign commerce other than that which Congress had
designated as such ...."); see also CURRIE, supra note 36, at 233 (noting lack of criteria for
differentiating between national and local subjects); NEWMYER, MARSHALL AND TANEY, supra
note 36, at 107 ("Curtis gave no clues beyond the case as to which aspects of commerce
required uniformity, which diversity. Nor did he supply any specific criteria for determining
these essential categories.").
88. NEWMYER, MARSHALL AND TANEY, supra note 36, at 107.
89. CURRIE, supra note 36, at 234.
90. SWISHER, supra note 53, at 407.
91. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 321, 325.
92. See also CURRIE, supra note 36, at 230 ("[Curtis] conjure[d] up out of the morass a
solid majority for a brand new commerce clause interpretation that would play a prominent
part in decisions for nearly a century.").
93. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
94. Whitehead's comment was that all philosophy is a footnote to Plato. ALFRED NORTH
WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY 39 (1979) ("The safest general characterization of the
European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.").
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C. The Direct/Indirect Test
However masterful the compromise, Cooley's distinction between
national and local subjects, without more, would not decide any
cases. Cooley "may have been the beginning of wisdom, but it
required still more appreciation of questions of degree, questions of
the extent of local need measured against the effects of local laws
on interstate commerce."95 The country, too, was changing, and
"[clonstitutional law [would have] to be stated in the light of the
evolving pattern of economic life."96 One of the most important
evolutions would be the transformation of American life wrought by
the railroad.9" A second was the beginning of mass-produced
consumer goods that could be advertised and sold nationwide.9 8
Both had important implications for judicial enforcement of the
DCCD.
First, these changes would, for all practical purposes, inter the
exclusivity theory Marshall had been tempted to adopt in Gibbons.
Despite the Court's continued invocation of exclusivity to justify
some decisions striking down state laws, it was clear that states had
concurrent power over interstate commerce, with a few developing
exceptions. Because states were regulating and taxing interstate
commerce, the Court would have to devise new decision rules to
separate permissible from impermissible state action.
In the case of nondiscriminatory laws or taxes, the Court
developed the "direct/indirect" test. But it was at this time that the
Court also began to focus on whether a state or local law discrimi-
nated against interstate commerce-that is, whether laws treated
out-of-state commerce or out-of-state commercial actors worse than
their in-state counterparts. Thus, the modern analytical structure
began to take shape. I will describe the emergence and application
of the direct-indirect distinction in this section, drawing on Barry
95. SWISHER, supra note 53, at 422.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., "the railroad system has burst through State limits":
Railroads and Interstate Commerce, 1830-1920, 55 ARK. L. REV. 933 (2003).
98. See, e.g., 7 CHARLES FAIRMAN, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs DEVISE HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, pt. 2 at
663-64 (1987).
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Cushman's outstanding survey.99 In the next subsection, I take up
the formulation of the antidiscrimination principle.
In addition to waging a campaign "to break down local barriers to
interstate trade" through the antidiscrimination principle, the late
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Court also subjected
"nondiscriminatory impediments to interstate trade" to its "exacting
scrutiny."'100 The Court invalidated state laws regulating everything
from liquor and cigarettes to the "operations of interstate carriers,"
the price of interstate goods, and the amount at which those goods
could be taxed.10 While the Court might refer to the "exclusive"
power of Congress when it applied the antidiscrimination
principle,"0 2 commentators began to realize that exclusivity as a
constitutional operative position was no longer tenable. Continued
reliance on exclusivity would mean an immense "regulatory
vacuum" that it was not at all clear Congress could fill, given the
limitations the Court had imposed on the Commerce Clause.0 3
But Cooley's opaque national/local rule was not much help either.
The Court developed a new decision rule: "regulations touching a
'national' matter or burdening interstate commerce 'directly' were
unconstitutional. But where 'local' matters were concerned, any
valid exercise of the police power or the power to tax that affected
interstate commerce only 'incidentally' or 'indirectly"' was a per-
99. Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1089 (2000).
100. Id. at 1101, 1103.
101. Id. at 1103-05. Cushman's article contains copious citations to the relevant cases. Id.
102. See id. at 1108 & n.98.
103. Id. at 1109-10. Later in his article, Cushman quotes at length the Court's opinion in
Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888), in which the Court upheld Iowa's prohibition on the
manufacture of liquor against a DCCD challenge. Cushman, supra note 99, at 1122. The
Court emphasized that were it to hold that "manufacture" was "commerce," the implications
for the taxing and regulatory powers of the state would be dire. Id. Showing the tenacity of
the theory of exclusivity, the Court declared that if commerce included manufacture or
production, Congress would be vested with enormous power "to the exclusion of the States."
Id. at 1122-23 (quoting Kidd, 128 U.S. at 21-22). Cushman writes:
If, as Lamar and his colleagues evidently maintained, the power to regulate
commerce were exclusive, a definition of commerce that included "local"
productive enterprise would have deprived states of the power to regulate such
enterprise, even in the absence of congressional action. This would not merely
have worked a revolution in federalism-it would have been the single greatest
act of deregulation in American history.
Id. at 1124 (footnotes omitted).
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missible exercise of state power.1 1 4 Professor Cushman put it well,
writing that:
[I]n an era in which federal efforts to regulate intrastate
activities were the exception rather than the rule, the principal
function of locating such activities in the local sphere and
holding that they affected interstate commerce only indirectly
was not to frustrate federal regulation, but instead to insulate
state and local regulatory and taxing initiatives from dormant
Commerce Clause attack.10 5
As Professor Cushman notes, the terms "direct" and "indirect"
were employed "rather indiscriminately across a broad range of
cases, causing no end of confusion and consternation among
contemporary commentators."10' 6 The cases can, however, be sorted
into two broad classes. The first included the lineal descendent of
Cooley: 'local" matters "over which Congress's jurisdiction was
paramount but not exclusive," such as nondiscriminatory labeling
and inspection statutes, quarantine laws, and grain elevator
rates.' 7 "With respect to this class of cases," Cushman writes, "the
permissibility of state regulation did not preclude federal action. In
each instance the opinion indicated that regulation of the matter in
question was within congressional competence."'0 8
In the second class of cases, however, the effect on interstate
commerce was said to be indirect or remote because the laws were
not regulations of interstate commerce at all. Laws "might operate
before interstate commerce had begun, or after it had ceased, but
they did not regulate subject matter entrusted to Congress under
the Commerce Clause."'0 9 From this second class of DCCD cases, the
Court derived its much criticized categories of direct/indirect effects
that limited Congress's affirmative power under the Commerce
Clause and placed off-limits centralized regulation of production and
104. Id. at 1110-12 & nn.104-09.
105. Id. at 1121.
106. Id. at 1114.
107. Id. at 1114-16.
108. Id. at 1116.
109. Id.
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manufacture, which were said to precede commerce, but were not a
part of it." 0
In either case, the effect was similar: these categories "rescued
from dormant Commerce Clause attacks" both "states' powers of
licensure and taxation" as well as their "regulatory powers."''
States could regulate insurance because, the Court held, insurance
was not commerce." 2 Inspection laws were permitted to govern
goods destined for, but not yet in, interstate commerce. 113 In both
cases, the effects on interstate commerce were held to be indirect or
remote. Other examples in both tax and regulatory cases abound in
Professor Cushman's article."'
In all the cases, the Court had designed decision rules that
implemented (and attempted to improve upon) Cooley, while
finessing the operative proposition. This was to be a recurring
pattern in the Court's history with the DCCD-failure to grapple
with the underlying operative proposition coupled with promulga-
tion of set after set of decision rules attempting to furnish officials
and litigants with a yardstick by which to measure the constitution-
ality of their actions. And many of those rules-the direct/indirect
test was no exception-would go on to meet the fate described by
Alexander Bickel: slow erosion or ignominious abandonment." 5
110. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Cushman, supra note 99,
at 1126 ("Affirmative Commerce Clause doctrine during this period ... was the flip side of the
Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence."); see also Cushman, supra note 99, at
1116-17 ("[T]he opinions in the second class might characterize ... statutes as 'affecting'
interstate commerce 'incidentally,' 'indirectly,' or 'remotely.' But here these terms had a
different significance. There was no suggestion in these cases that these were matters over
which Congress might assert its regulatory authority. Such matters were 'purely' or
'essentially' local,' subject solely to state and local regulation, beyond the reach of the
commerce power.").
111. Cushman, supra note 99, at 1119.
112. See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1869); Cushman, supra note 99,
at 1119.
113. See, e.g., Turner v. Maryland, 107 U.S. 38, 54-56 (1883); Cushman, supra note 99, at
1119.
114. Cushman, supra note 99, at 1120-21. An enormous number of cases arose from state
regulation of railroads-everything from rates, to the size of crews, to the safety devices to be
employed-scores of which garnered DCCD challenges. For an extremely helpful overview,
see generally Ely, supra note 97, at 937-61. As Professor Ely ruefully notes, however, "[i]t is
a futile quest to seek in the railroad cases a precise delination of state authority to regulate
aspects of commerce." Id. at 961.
115. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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D. The Rise of the Antidiscrimination Principle
Despite the ultimate sterility of the direct/indirect test, a
contemporary decision rule, the antidiscrimination principle, has
proven extremely robust, or, to continue the fertility metaphor,
virile in the years following its emergence. Yet both its emergence
and its constitutional pedigree remain something of a mystery.
Beginning in the 1860s," 6 the Court upheld some nondiscriminatory
taxes, but stressed the fact that the taxes imposed were no greater
than those imposed on domestic goods or producers, without clearly
explaining why their nondiscriminatory status was decisive.117
Then in the 1870 case of Ward v. Maryland,18 the Court struck
down a state law barring out-of-state salesmen from selling out-of-
state products in Baltimore without a license. 9 The Court rested its
decision on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2,120 but in a concurrence, Justice Bradley argued that the
law also violated the Commerce Clause. 2' The Court then cited
Ward as support for its 1876 decision in Welton v. Missouri, which
stuck down a Missouri tax imposed on peddlers of out-of-state
goods. 122 Nor was Welton the only example of the Court importing an
antidiscrimination norm from a related constitutional provision into
the Commerce Clause. Earlier, in Woodruff v. Parham,23 the Court
recharacterized a Taney Court Import-Export Clause case as a
DCCD case in the course of limiting the Import-Export Clause's
application to foreign commerce only.'24
116. See Cushman, supra note 99, at 1101 ("As the national economy became increasingly
integrated in the years following the Civil War, the Court began a conscious and increasingly
aggressive campaign to break down local barriers to interstate trade through a 'free-trade'
construction of the dormant Commerce Clause.").
117. See Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 148 (1869); Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
123 (1868); FAIRMAN, supra note 98, pt. 1 at 1403-04.
118. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870).
119. Id. at 419, 432.
120. Id. at 430.
121. Id. at 432-33 (Bradley, J., concurring).
122. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 276 (1876).
123. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868).
124. Id. at 137-38. The earlier case was Almy v. California, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 169 (1861),
in which the Taney Court struck down a California tax on the export of gold from the state.
Almy relied in part on Chief Justice Marshall's casual comment in Brown v. Maryland that
he supposed the Import-Export Clause applied to domestic as well as to foreign commerce.
Almy, 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 173; Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 449 (1827). For
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Welton was frequently cited thereafter in a variety of cases
striking down discriminatory taxes on everything from auctions of
foreign goods,' 25 to vessels carrying out-of-state goods,' 26 to peddlers
of out-of-state goods,' 27 to liquor.'25 As Charles Fairman commented,
"[t]hat exactions of long standing were now being challenged
suggest[ed] a new sense of nationalism, to which the centennial
decision in Welton gave expression."'29
Whatever the impetus, the antidiscrimination principle proved
such an attractive one to the Justices that in little over a decade
after Welton, the Court expanded it to invalidate a facially neutral
tax with discriminatory effects in Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing
District,'30 and to non-tax regulations, like discriminatory inspection
laws.'3 ' Though the local tax on drummers in Robbins did not draw
an explicit geographical distinction with regard to the goods or the
drummer himself, "drummers (unlike peddlers) were peculiarly and
characteristically engaged in ... interstate sales.' 3 2
The question arises, however: why did the Court feel that the
constitutional command of the Commerce Clause mandated an
antidiscrimination principle at all? The Court offered several
reasons. In Welton, the Court seemed to equate uniformity with
nondiscrimination,1 3 and supposed that, in the absence of congres-
sional legislation permitting the discrimination, Congress's inaction
a discussion of all these cases, see generally Brannon P. Denning, Justice Thomas, the Import-
Export Clause, and Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 155
(1999).
125. Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566, 573 (1878).
126. Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 439 (1879).
127. Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1880) (striking down a discriminatory
charge of agent selling Singer sewing machines).
128. Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 455 (1886).
129. FAIRMAN, supra note 98, pt. 2 at 666.
130. 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
131. See, e.g., Voight v. Wright, 141 U.S. 62, 66-67 (1891); Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S.
78, 84 (1891); see also Cushman, supra note 99, at 1103.
132. FAIRMAN, supra note 98, pt. 2 at 667; see also id. at 668 (noting that "in numberless
instances the only feasible way to obtain orders was by personal solicitation, and in many
branches ... by exhibiting samples"). The Court did not use a term like "discrimination in
effects." It concluded, however, that the local exaction fell on interstate commerce itself, that
is to say, "directly" on interstate commerce, which made it invalid. Id.
133. See Cushman, supra note 99, at 1102 ("The Constitution 'had its immediate origin in
the necessities of commerce; and for its immediate object ... establishing a uniform and steady
system.'" (quoting Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 440 (1879))).
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implied a desire that interstate commerce "shall be free and
untrammelled."34 Thus, some Justices conceived of the anti-
discrimination principle as a particular application of Cooley. Other
Justices saw it as a convenient rule for restraining the states
without completely abrogating their power to tax interstate
commerce.' Occasionally, members of the Court would give a
historical reason-that preventing discriminatory laws was the
reason that the Commerce Clause was drafted.
13 6
E. 'Balancing" and the Emergence of the Modern Approach
The early twentieth century, then, saw the Court lurch towards
an agreed-upon doctrinal formula, if not on that formula's applica-
tion in each case. The direct/indirect test had emerged as a gloss on
Cooley's national/local distinction, and the antidiscrimination
principle could even be characterized (as it was by Justice Cardozo)
as an example of the sort of "direct" restraint on interstate com-
merce denied to states.13 Uncertainty still persisted, though, over
the constitutional warrant for this implied restriction, 3 ' and it was
not long before frustration over the inability to accurately predict
what constituted a direct versus an indirect burden on commerce
would lead to calls for yet another test.
The occasion was the Court's invalidation, in DiSanto v. Pennsyl-
vania,139 of a requirement that those selling tickets to passengers
making overseas voyages be bonded.14 ° The state defended the law
as necessary to prevent fraud, but the Court found it a direct
restraint on interstate and foreign commerce.' 4 ' The harbinger of
change was Justice Stone, who dissented from the Court's decision;
Justices Holmes and Brandeis joined in his dissent. "[Tihe purpose
of the commerce clause," he complained, "was not to preclude all
state regulation of commerce crossing state lines, but to prevent
134. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1876).
135. See, e.g., Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489,501 (1887) (Waite, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that interstate commerce ought to be made to pay its own way).
136. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
137. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935).
138. See infra Part IVA.
139. 273 U.S. 34 (1927).
140. Id. at 35-36.
141. Id. at 37.
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discrimination and the erection of barriers or obstacles to the free
flow of commerce, interstate or foreign.' 42
Adverting to Cooley, Stone noted that with regard to "matters of
local concern which may properly be subject to state regulation and
which, because of their local character, as well as their number and
diversity, can never be adequately dealt with by Congress," a state
was free to regulate "so long as it does not impede the free flow of
commerce." 143 Inquiring whether a law was a "direct" or "indirect"
burden, he argued, "seems ... too mechanical, too uncertain in its
application, and too remote from actualities, to be of value.' 44 The
Court was merely "using labels to describe a result rather than any
trustworthy formula by which it is reached."'45 His preferred
solution was to uphold state laws that
because a consideration of all the facts and circumstances, such
as the nature of the regulation, its function, the character of the
business involved and the actual effect on the flow of commerce,
lead to the conclusion that the regulation concerns interests
peculiarly local and does not infringe the national interest in
maintaining the freedom of commerce across state lines.14
Stone's critique caught the attention of scholars, who urged the
Court to adopt the frank balancing of national and local interests
that the DiSanto dissent proposed. John Sholley wrote that the
Court should abandon its prior approaches in favor of conducting an
"inquiry [extending] to a consideration of all the circumstances of
the case. The test would be ... which interest, that of state or nation,
should prevail.' 1 47 Many of the Court's prior inquiries-into the
purpose of the legislation or the "incidence of the burden ... whether
direct or indirect"-might be considered as factors in the ultimate
determination, but none would control. 48
142. Id. at 43-44 (Stone, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 44.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. John B. Sholley, The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. Cm. L. REV.
556, 592 (1936).
148. Id. at 593.
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In South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell
Bros.," 9 Stone got the opportunity to make his DiSanto dissent the
law. Upholding a state restriction on the size and weight of trucks
traveling on state highway, Stone drew a distinction between
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory state regulations. 'The
commerce clause, by its own force," he wrote, "prohibits discrimina-
tion against interstate commerce, whatever its form or method ....
It was to end these practices that the commerce clause was
adopted."'' ° Because South Carolina's law was nondiscriminatory, 5'
and "[flew subjects of state regulation are so peculiarly of local
concern as is the use of state highways,"'52 the Court was inclined
to permit the state leeway as long as Congress had not intervened.
'"There are [a] few [matters], local regulation of which is so insepara-
ble from a substantial effect on interstate commerce.' 53 When
Congress was silent, and the state passed nondiscriminatory laws
regulating local matters, "the judicial function ... under the com-
merce clause ... stops with the inquiry whether the state legislature
... has acted within its province, and whether the means of regula-
tion chosen are reasonably adapted to the end sought."'54
Seven years later, Stone-influenced perhaps by an article by
Noel Dowling' 55-wrote the paradigmatic balancing opinion in
149. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
150. Id. at 185-86. Even before Barnwell's straightforward replacement of the
direct/indirect test with what we came to know as "balancing," Justice Cardozo, in Baldwin
v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935), struck down a state law prohibiting the in-state
resale of milk purchased out-of-state if the price paid for the milk was lower than the state
minimum. "Neither the power to tax nor the police power," Cardozo wrote, "may be used by
the state of destination with the aim and effect of establishing an economic barrier against
competition with the products of another state or the labor of its residents." Id. at 527.
Discrimination against interstate commerce was in and ofitselfa forbidden "direct" regulation
of commerce. Id. at 522.
151. But see Barnwell, 303 U.S. at 182 (noting trial court finding that "from 85 to 90
percent of the motor trucks used in interstate transportation" exceeded the standards set by
South Carolina).
152. Id. at 187.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 190.
155. See Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1 (1940).
Dowling proposed that the Court adopt a balancing test along the lines of that which emerged
in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona. Id. at 19-28. He wrote that "in the absence of affirmative
consent a Congressional negative will be presumed in the courts against state action which
in its effect upon interstate commerce constitutes an unreasonable interference with national
interests, the presumption being rebuttable at the pleasure of Congress." Id. at 20. Dowling
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Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona.5 6 Arizona had passed a statute
regulating the length of passenger and freight trains that was
markedly different from those in surrounding states.5 7 The Court
concluded that the statute was unconstitutional because the alleged
safety benefits to railyard workers were outweighed by the costs to
the railroads, which would have to avoid Arizona or uncouple and
recouple train cars when passing through the state. 5 ' Of particular
interest here, though, is Chief Justice Stone's refinement of the
balancing test at which DiSanto and Barnwell Bros. hinted.
He began by noting that ever since Willson and Cooley, the Court
has "recognized that, in the absence of conflicting legislation by
Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws
governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some
measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent,
regulate it."'59 Specifically, "the states may regulate matters which,
because of their number and diversity, may never be adequately
dealt with by Congress. ' In such cases, "[w]hen the regulation of
matters of local concern is local in character and effect, and its
impact on the national commerce does not seriously interfere with
its operation ... such regulation has been generally held to be within
state authority." ''
But even as to these matters, the Commerce Clause, "without the
aid of Congressional legislation, thus affords some protection from
state legislation inimical to the national commerce, and that in such
cases, where Congress has not acted, this Court ... is under the
commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing demands of state
and national interests."'62 Summarizing the Court's decisions, Stone
concluded that
gave five reasons for adopting his proposal: (1) it represented, in fact, what the Court was
already doing in many of its cases; (2) it introduced no new or novel proposition, the test of
"reasonableness" being familiar to members of the Court; (3) it was a "flexible" doctrine that
took account of national and state interests; (4) it would likely be agreeable to Congress; and
(5) it represented what might now be called, after Sunstein, an "incompletely theorized
agreement" around which members of the Court could coalesce. Id. at 20-28.
156. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
157. See id. at 771, 773.
158. Id. at 773.
159. Id. at 767.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 769.
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[t]here has thus been left to the states wide scope for the
regulation of matters of local state concern, even though it in
some measure affects the commerce, provided it does not
materially restrict the free flow of commerce across state lines,
or interfere with it in matters with respect to which uniformity
of regulation is of predominant national concern."
From those cases he articulated the following rule:
[Tihe matters for ultimate determination here are the nature
and extent of the burden which the state regulation ... imposes
on interstate commerce, and whether the relative weights of the
state and national interests involved are such as to make
inapplicable the rule ... that the free flow of interstate commerce
and its freedom from local restraints in matters requiring
uniformity of regulation are interests safeguarded by the
commerce clause from state interference. 6
Twenty-five years later, the Court decided Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc. 16 in which the Court confirmed that Chief Justice Stone's
balancing approach had endured, and gave it a new name--"Pike
balancing." According to the Pike Court:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.... If a legitimate local
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And
the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.
1 66
"Occasionally," it acknowledged, "the Court has candidly under-
taken a balancing approach in resolving these issues ... but more
163. Id. at 770.
164. Id. at 770-71.
165. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
166. Id. at 142.
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frequently it has spoken in terms of 'direct' and 'indirect' effects and
burdens."6 7
Though the case is famous for its articulation of the Pike test, the
Court did not actually apply it, finding instead that the Arizona law
requiring the labeling of cantaloupes prior to export ran afoul of
another line of cases in which the Court "ha[d] viewed with
particular suspicion state statutes requiring business operations
to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be
performed elsewhere."'68 A few years later, in City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey,'69 the Court was able to state flatly that discrimina-
tory statutes raised the specter of economic protectionism and
triggered a "virtually per se rule of invalidity."'7 ° By the end of the
1970s, then, the outlines of the now-familiar two-tiered standard of
review were discernable,' 7 ' and each, as we have seen, had deep
roots in the Court's DCCD jurisprudence.
The point of this doctrinal safari is this: since Marshall, the Court
has been searching for a coherent set of rules to decide DCCD cases
sensibly. What has inhibited it, both then and now, is that the Court
has often framed decision rules without a clear articulation of the
constitutional operative proposition the rules implemented. My
project for the remainder of this Article will be to reframe the
DCCD's constitutional operative proposition (while discussing and
rejecting much of the Court's prior attempts, such as they were, at
framing one), and then to construct sensible decision rules that
implement that proposition. First, however, I will show that the
DCCD's current stability is an illusion. Contemporary doctrine, too,
is showing signs of the strain.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 145.
169. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
170. Id. at 624.
171. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, the Commerce Clause,
and State Control of Natural Resources, 1979 SuP. CT. REV. 51, 51 ("The Supreme Court's
recent Commerce Clause opinions reflect an apparent effort to rationalize and modernize the
analytical framework for delineating the implied restraints that the Clause imposes on state
legislation.").
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III. THE COURT, THE DCCD, AND "CONSTITUTIONAL
CALCIFICATION"
Nothing gold can stay; doctrine, like everything else, eventually
succumbs to the forces of entropy. As the preceding Part demon-
strates, constitutional doctrine has a sort of half-life-a point at
which it begins to degrade and decay. Eventually, old doctrine is
replaced by something "better."
Building on the work of Fallon and Berman, Professor Kermit
Roosevelt has offered a tentative account of doctrinal collapse and
reformation. He asks, "how [does] the law become[ ] what the Court
does?" '172 The substitution of judicial gloss for constitutional com-
mand, he explains, occurs when the doctrine itself is conflated with
constitutional commands-when, in other words, we confuse deci-
sion rules with operative propositions.' What Roosevelt terms
"calcification" comes in minor and major forms.' 4 Either presages
the need for doctrinal modification; the major form of calcification,
however, can do great harm before it is replaced.
In this Part, I will describe Professor Roosevelt's theory of
calcification and show that the contemporary DCCD is exhibiting
signs of minor and major calcification. The doctrinal problems
plaguing the DCCD strongly suggest that the lessons of the past
have not yet been learned, and affirms the point with which I ended
the last Part: that the doctrine still lacks firm grounding in the
Constitution. That, in turn, has stymied the development of stable
decision rules to implement the constitutional command.
A. Decision Rules and Calcification
1. Minor Calcification
Professor Roosevelt identifies 'loss of fit" and "subterfuge" as
minor forms of calcification attending the creation of doctrinal
rules.'75 Loss of fit occurs when, through the passage of time,
172. Roosevelt, supra note 14, at 1649.
173. Id. at 1689-1700.
174. Id. at 1686, 1692.
175. Id. at 1686, 1689.
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"[a]pproaches that once appeared feasible and coherent may come
to seem neither; practices that once seemed natural may start
striking people as ideologically freighted, and later obviously
invidious.'' 176 The Court might then have to change the rules it
employs to decide those cases. 177 For example, sex discrimination
claims were, as late as the late 1940s, decided under rational basis
rules. This was indefensible by the early 1970s when perceptions
about "discrimination against women had shifted from natural to
invidious." '178
"Subterfuge," however, occurs when the Court "succumb[s] to the
temptation to get a particular case right ... rather than faithfully
applying" the doctrinal rules it has created. 79 This may occur
because the Court itself begins to sense a loss of fit, but lacks
consensus on how to fix the doctrinal rules.8 ° So, it puts a thumb on
the scales. Think, for example, of the numerous cases in which the
Court has applied a more searching form of rational basis re-
view-rational basis with teeth-instead of recognizing a new
fundamental right or suspect classification.'' Subterfuge confuses
lower courts and "makes the Court appear arrogant, unprincipled,
or both" by "suggest[ing] a lack of faith in either the lower courts or
the unannounced rule, or perhaps a belief that society will not
accept it."'82
2. Major Calcification
Major calcification, however, describes a more serious problem.
Inevitably, over time, doctrine becomes more complex. Additional
rules may be created, some of which depart substantially from the
constitutional command, in order to deal with "the sort of problems
176. Id. at 1686.
177. Id. at 1687.
178. Id. at 1687-88.
179. Id. at 1689-90.
180. Id.
181. Id.; see, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 632 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,442-44 (1985).
Early sex discrimination cases did this as well. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77
(1971).
182. Roosevelt, supra note 14, at 1691.
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presented by adjudication."'83 When minor problems crop up, like
those described above, they probably indicate that a change in the
doctrinal rules is needed."8 But "when a stable jurisprudential
regime has persisted for a period of time," the Court may begin to
confuse the doctrine with the constitutional value or command it is
supposed to implement. 85 "When this happens," Roosevelt argues,
"a number of undesirable consequences follow." '186
The confusion of ends (constitutional commands) and means
(constitutional doctrine) may "warp[ ] doctrine," either by causing
a Court to discard doctrinal rules that do not make sense as
constitutional commands, or by accepting doctrine as a constitu-
tional command "and mak[ing] other doctrinal changes, in the same
or related fields, in order to maintain consistency."'87
One example Roosevelt gives is strict scrutiny of racial classifica-
tions in equal protection cases.1 88 Whereas the constitutional
command-treat all persons equally-must apply to all persons, the
doctrinal rules do not: "[D]ecision rules will have special favorites,
as long as, and to the extent that, state actors have special
victims."'8 9 He criticizes the Court's affirmative action jurispru-
dence, which scrutinizes affirmative action programs that are
motivated to aid minorities, but do not evince animus towards
Caucasians, as strictly as it would a program of invidious discrimi-
nation aimed at a particular racial group.19 0
Another consequence of confusing the Constitution with the rules
the Court fashions to enforce it occurs "[wihen the Court treats its
decision rules as operative propositions," thus announcing "as
constitutional truths rules that should neither be followed by
nonjudicial actors nor internalized by the general public."'91 Simply
because the Court has chosen doctrinal rules that cause it to stay its
183. Id. at 1692.
184. Id. at 1692-93 ("Decision rules may lose fit over time if facts or background unders-
tandings change. When this happens, the Court may-indeed, should--change the decision
rule to fit the new circumstances. In doing so, the Court is simply employing a new method
to implement an unchanging operative proposition.").
185. Id. at 1693.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1700-07.
189. Id. at 1703.
190. Id. at 1704-05.
191. Id. at 1713.
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hand in certain circumstances or with regard to certain subjects
does not mean, perforce, that the Constitution's meaning is bounded
by the Court's reticence.
The Court would likely hold that a law that requires all persons
wishing to arrange flowers to be licensed as a florist192 does not fail
the rational basis test, but such holding should not be taken to
mean that the Constitution requires states to pass such laws, or that
such laws do not violate the constitutional rights of unlicenced,
would-be flower arrangers.193 To believe otherwise is to deny the
agency of other branches of government in the interpretation and
enforcement of the Constitution.'94 At that point, as the subtitle of
Roosevelt's article says, "the law" then becomes no more than "what
the Court does."'95
B. Calcification and the DCCD
A loss of fit, presaging changes in doctrinal rules, has been a
hallmark of the DCCD. Marshall attempted to distinguish between
regulations of commerce and exercises of the police power; Curtis
distinguished between national and local matters, which either
proscribed or permitted state regulation; the Cooley distinction was
then replaced with an inquiry into a state regulation's direct or
indirect effect on commerce, which, in turn, was replaced by an
explicit weighing of interests.'96 The switch from one set of doctrinal
rules to another was often a response to changes in circumstances
that rendered the previous test unworkable or prior distinctions
untenable.197 And though---or perhaps because-the two-tiered stan-
192. See, e.g., Meadows v. Odom, 360 F. Supp. 2d 811 (M.D. La. 2005) (upholding Louisiana
licensing scheme for florists), vacated No. 05-30450, 2006 WL 2168631 (5th Cir. Aug. 1, 2006).
193. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978) (describing constitutional under-
enforcement).
194. Roosevelt, supra note 14, at 1716-17.
195. Id. at 1649.
196. The Court's doctrinal history is further detailed in Part II, supra. Limits on the taxing
power went through a similar progression, from the "original package" doctrine, to immunity
of interstate commerce from state taxation, to Complete Auto's multi-factor test. See generally
HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, 4.06-.18.
197. Academic commentary, for example, encouraged the Court's formal adoption of
balancing in place of the direct/indirect test. See, e.g., Dowling, supra note 155; Sholley, supra
note 147.
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dard of review has been stable for several decades, instability
appears to be creeping back in.
This Part applies Roosevelt's general observations to the DCCD.
Although it is not a comprehensive overview of all recent cases, this
Part argues that both tiers suffer from the minor and major
problems that Roosevelt describes. Specifically, Pike balancing and
the antidiscrimination rule exhibit signs of 'loss of fit." Some recent
DCCD decisions, moreover, smack of subterfuge, as the Court
refuses, sometimes on dubious grounds, to follow its own doctrine to
a result the doctrine itself seems to compel. More serious, however,
are the signs that major calcification, too, has settled in; constitu-
tional commands and decision rules have been conflated, producing
confusion and incoherence, not to mention flawed decision rules.
1. Pike Balancing
a. Loss of Fit
Balancing local benefits and interstate burdens was originally
touted as a superior decision rule to the direct/indirect test. Its
advocates thought balancing to be better suited to determining
whether the regulation of a particular subject required a national,
as opposed to a local, rule. 9 ' The more cost to interstate commerce,
relative to the local benefit, the more likely Congress should be the
body to regulate the subject, if it was to be regulated at all.'99 From
the late 1940s to the 1970s, when Southern Pacific and Pike
enshrined balancing as a feature of the DCCD, balancing was a
familiar-perhaps pervasive-feature of constitutional law.2 °°
'Totality of the circumstances" tests, "balancing," and the like
proliferated during the Warren and Burger Courts.20 1 It is not
surprising that such tests were then in full flower, given that belief
198. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the
States, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 483, 530 (1997).
199. Id.
200. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943 (1987).
201. For examples, including those from outside the DCCD, see id. at 944-48, 963-72.
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in the wisdom and capacity of courts to solve myriad social problems
was at an all-time high. °2
In the 1980s, however, scholars and judges began to question both
the justification for employing balancing, as well as the capacity of
judges-as opposed to other policymakers-to employ it well.
Balancing, complained Alexander Aleinikoff in an influential article,
was "surprising[ly] ... rudimentary."2 °3 Balancing required the
weighing of competing, but incommensurable, interests-in-
commensurable because of a lack of an identifiable metric. °4 The
Court also picked and chose among interests, designating some
important enough to be weighed explicitly, while ignoring others,
including "the interests of non-parties."" 5 In actual use, "balancing
takes place inside a black box," and "raises the specter of the kind
of judicial decisionmaking ... that balancing promised to over-
come."2 °6 Opinions in which it has been employed, he argued,
"severely damaged the credibility of the methodology."2 °7
In addition to his internal critique of balancing, Professor
Aleinikoff argued that balancing was subject to a powerful external
critique as well, invoking the now-familiar concept of "institutional
competence., 208 Balancing benefits and burdens is what we expect
legislatures to do when choosing among competing policies. °9 It is
not immediately obvious why those legislative choices should be
overridden by the Court in constitutional adjudication. 2" Balancing
denigrated important constitutional values, equating them with
other competing "interests" and then, perhaps, balancing them
202. For an account of balancing's origins, see id. at 952-63.
203. Id. at 982.
204. Id. at 972-76. "The most troubling consequence of the problem of deriving a common
scale are those cases in which the Court simply does not disclose its source for the weights
assigned to the interests." Id. at 976.
205. Id. at 977-78 ("Taking balancing seriously would seem to demand the kind of
investigation of the world that courts are unable or unwilling to undertake."); id. at 978-79
(discussing the fact that the interests of non-parties are relevant, but not considered, in much
of the Court's balancing).
206. Id. at 976.
207. Id. at 982.
208. Id. at 984-86.
209. Id. at 984.
210. Id. at 984-86 (arguing that defenders of balancing "must suggest reasons why
judgments assigning a social value to legislation are within the province and capacity of the
courts.").
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away. 211 Further, a faux precision drives balancing and conceals
value choices with objective-sounding "[t]hree-pronged tests, two-
tier standards, and cost benefit analyses [that] litter the constitu-
tional landscape. 212
Judicial critiques echoed the academic ones.13 When balancing
was explicitly adopted by the Court in DCCD cases, Justice Black
dissented, arguing that second-guessing legislatures through
balancing placed the Court in the position of a "super-legislature. 21 4
Balancing the probabilities that shortening trains would reduce
accidents, as opposed to lengthening them because of crowded yards
and tracks, he noted in Southern Pacific, was "not ... a matter for
judicial determination, but one which calls for legislative consider-
ation. '
On the current Court, Justice Scalia is famous for his critique of
balancing in DCCD cases. Building on Justice Black's criticism,
Scalia has remarked that balancing the burdens and benefits of
state regulations "is ill suited to the judicial function and should be
undertaken rarely if at all."2 6 In another case, he complained that
balancing asked courts to compare the incomparable-to "judg[e]
whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is
heavy." '217 Justice Thomas, another vociferous critic of the DCCD,
has likewise argued that any test requiring the Court to assess:
(1) whether a particular statute serves a "legitimate" local public
interest; (2) whether the effects of the statute on interstate
commerce are merely "incidental" or "clearly excessive in
211. Id. at 986-92 ("[A]s Ronald Dworkin has tirelessly argued, viewing constitutional
rights simply as 'interests' that may be overcome by other non-constitutional interests does
not accord with common understandings of the meaning of a 'right. (footnote omitted)).
212. Id. at 992; cf. Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 165
(1985) ("During roughly the last thirty years a new style of opinion writing has emerged as
the most common method of constitutional exegesis. This style emphasizes formalized
doctrine expressed in elaborately layered sets of 'tests' or 'prongs' or 'requirements' or
'standards' or 'hurdles.- (footnotes omitted)).
213. Aleinikoff, supra note 200, at 966 (citing Pike balancing as a paradigmatic example
of the genre); see also Nagel, supra note 212, at 167 n.10, 201-03 (using DCCD cases as
examples of the "formulaic style").
214. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 788 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 794.
216. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
217. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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relation to the putative benefits"; (3) the "nature" of the local
interest; and (4) whether there are alternative means of further-
ing the local interest that have a "lesser impact" on interstate
commerce ... surely invites us, if not compels us, to function
more as legislators than as judges."'
While Justice Scalia has not been able to persuade his colleagues to
discard Pike balancing completely,219 it is perhaps no accident that
the Court has not invalidated a state or local law under balancing
since Justice Scalia has been on the Court.22 °
Though nominally retained as part of the doctrine's structure, we
can see that-as with balancing generally-what was seen as an
antidote to "formalistic" doctrinal rules about "direct and indirect
effects" that concealed value judgments, has itself come into
question, with scholars and judges criticizing balancing in the
DCCD as both impossible and inappropriate for courts. Even when
balancing was in full flower, actual cases often seemed to turn on
something other than a frank comparison of burdens and benefits,
as the next Part will show.
b. Subterfuge
That the doctrinal formulae employed by the Court do not really
determine the outcome of DCCD cases is another common complaint
of judicial and academic critics. Many articles on the DCCD feature
Herculean analyses of cases in an attempt to synthesize the "real"
rules the Court is using.221 Occasionally, Justices get into the act.
Recall Justice Stone's complaint in 1927 that the direct/indirect test
used 'labels to describe a result rather than any trustworthy
218. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 619 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
219. For a recent (though desultory) application of Pike balancing, see United Haulers
Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1797-98
(2007).
220. The last case in which the Court did so was Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
See David S. Day, The "Mature"Rehnquist Court and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine:
The Expanded Discrimination Tier, 52 S.D. L. REV. 1, 49 (2007) (suggesting that Scalia's
critique has impacted the Court's application of the DCCD).
221. Prominent recent examples include Regan, supra note 10, Stearns, supra note 10, and
Williams, supra note 10. For older examples, see Dowling, supra note 155, and Sholley, supra
note 147.
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formula by which it is reached. 2 22 Professor Regan, echoing Justice
Stone, argued in a famous article that the balancing test Justice
Stone helped establish was itself simply rhetorical cover for what
the Court was really doing: rooting out purposeful economic
protectionism. 2 ' The Court's cases allegedly employing balancing
have certainly given critics plenty of fodder.
Take Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,224 for example, which lent its
name to the balancing test employed in the absence of discrimina-
tion. The Court never really applied balancing in Pike.225 The Court
instead invoked its historic hostility to state laws requiring local
processing of goods before export to strike down Arizona's law
requiring cantaloupes to bear some indication of their origin before
being sent out of state.26 Justice Stewart wrote that
the Court has viewed with particular suspicion state statutes
requiring business operations to be performed in the home State
that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere. Even where
the State is pursuing a clearly legitimate local interest, this
particular burden on commerce has been declared to be virtually
per se illegal." 7
Likewise, in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,228 a
plurality of the Court purported to apply Pike balancing in invali-
dating Iowa's restrictions on sixty-foot "doubles. 229 While Justice
Powell dutifully compared the burdens on the trucking company to
the benefits (such as they were) of the ban, he repeatedly discussed
evidence of discriminatory purpose behind the law, disclaiming all
the while any reliance on such evidence in striking the law down.23°
Yet it is apparent (as it was to Justices Brennan and Marshall, who
222. DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting).
223. Regan, supra note 10, at 1092 ("Despite what the Court has said, it has not been
balancing .... [In] movement of goods cases ... the Court has been concerned exclusively with
preventing states from engaging in purposeful economic protectionism.").
224. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
225. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
226. Pike, 397 U.S. at 139, 142-43.
227. Id. at 145.
228. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
229. Id. at 665.
230. Id. at 665-66 & nn.6-7.
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concurred, finding the law discriminatory) 231 that the evidence
influenced the plurality, causing it to look skeptically at the safety
justifications offered by the state in defense of its law.232 Cases like
Pike and Kassel led Donald Regan famously to conclude that
balancing was largely a sham.233
c. Major Calcification
After demonstrating Pike balancing's loss of fit and the tendency
of the Court to engage in subterfuge when employing it, citing it as
an example of major calcification may seem like piling on. But Pike
balancing captures perfectly the conflation of decision rules with
constitutional commands that Roosevelt describes.
Recall balancing's origins: Cooley was an attempt to sort permissi-
ble from impermissible state taxation and regulation of interstate
commerce that improved upon Chief Justice Marshall's purpose
inquiry.2 4 Cooley's national/local distinction was itself a decision
rule that attempted to implement what was assumed to be a limit
the Constitution imposed on states. But, as I will discuss in more
detail in the next Part, the constitutional command here was pretty
vague-akin to Thomas Reed Powell's famous "Restatement of
Constitutional Law," in which "[t]he states may ... regulate inter-
state commerce, but not too much," and that "[h]ow much is too
much is beyond the scope of this Restatement." '235
Since Justice Curtis provided no ex ante criteria for distinguish-
ing national from local matters, the direct/indirect test developed to
implement the national/local distinction. By the mid-1940s, when
balancing was institutionalized, the weighing of benefits and
burdens was yet another set of decision rules implementing decision
231. Id. at 679 (Brennan, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 671 n.12 (majority opinion) (noting that the exemptions in the statute benefiting
in-state interests lowered the deference traditionally afforded state highway safety
regulations).
233. Regan, supra note 10, at 1092 ("In the central area of dormant commerce clause
jurisprudence, comprising what I shall call 'movement-of-goods' cases (Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc. may be taken as paradigmatic), the Court has been concerned exclusively with preventing
states from engaging in purposeful economic protectionism." (footnote omitted)).
234. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
235. Paul A. Freund, Foreword to THOMAS REED POWEL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, at vii, ix (2002 ed. Columbia University Press 1956).
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rules that were taken to be a constitutional command-that states
could regulate local, but not national, subjects; evidence that
burdens on interstate commerce clearly outweighed local benefits
suggested that it was a national problem to be regulated by
Congress, if at all.
The result was like a doctrinal game of Telephone in which the
players have garbled or ignored the initial constitutional command,
devising doctrine to implement prior, unworkable doctrine as if that
earlier doctrine itself was the constitutional command. The Constitu-
tion does not say that states may regulate interstate commerce, but
not too much; it does not allocate responsibility based on the
national or local nature of the subject, or permit state regulation
where burdens on interstate commerce do not clearly outweigh local
benefits. But Pike's decision rule acts as if it does.
2. The Antidiscrimination Principle
a. Loss of Fit
Pike balancing is not the only feature of the DCCD's two-tiered
standard of review to suffer from a loss of fit. Even the DCCD's
antidiscrimination principle has, in certain of its applications, been
criticized as too rigid, resulting in the invalidation of too many
legitimate state and local laws. Critics charge that the anti-
discrimination principle is a blunt tool, insufficiently sensitive to
laws advancing important state and local interests.3 6 At its worst,
it is a tool for the promotion of an economic ideology that smacks of
Lochnerian economic substantive due process. Other critics argue
that it produces indefensible, incoherent results.237
The "blunt tool" school of criticism is most often voiced by scholars
who are dissatisfied with the antidiscrimination principle's applica-
tion to state and local attempts to deal with the problem of out-of-
state garbage.2"' The Court's presumption that discrimination is a
236. See infra note 237.
237. See infra notes 243-60 and accompanying text.
238. For a selection, see generally Jonathan H. Adler, Waste & the Dormant Commerce
Clause-A Reply, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 353 (2000); Stanley E. Cox, Garbage In, Garbage Out:
Court Confusion About the Dormant Commerce Clause, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 155 (1997); Richard
A. Epstein, Waste & the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 29 (1999); Richard A.
2008] 459
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
proxy for economic protectionism is not fine-grained enough to
permit states to protect themselves from being adversely selected by
garbage-exporting states, which forces them to bear the long-term
costs of their citizens' waste generation." 9 Some urge the Court to
decouple discrimination from protectionism, invalidating laws-
even facially discriminatory laws-only if a protectionist motive is
proven.24 °
The antidiscrimination principle's lack of subtlety has led some
scholars (and judges) to suspect that the Court's rule proceeds from
unexamined, unstated economic and political presuppositions, much
like those of the Lochner Court. Professor Lisa Heinzerling has
argued that
the Court's nondiscrimination principle promotes a certain
vision of the proper role of government. The Court's concept of
discrimination embodies a preference for markets over regula-
tion, and its view of what counts as "regulation" rests on
undefended assumptions-reminiscent of the Lochner period,
when forced departures from the free market as shaped by
common-law entitlements were constitutionally suspect but the
common-law entitlements were not-about what counts as
government action and what counts as inaction.24'
Similarly, Professor Paul McGreal argued that the Court omits an
inquiry-whether discrimination "harm[s] the welfare of the
national economy"-from its DCCD cases that it had historically
undertaken.2 42 That question is now assumed away because "the
Epstein, Waste & the Dormant Commerce Clause-A Reprise, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 363 (2000);
Jess 0. Hale, Jr., Trash Is Commerce-Go Directly to Washington and Muddle Along: Solid
Waste Management in Tennessee and the Commerce Clause, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 293 (2006);
Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1(2003);
Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the
Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REv. 703, 755-56 (2000); Paula C. Murray & David B. Spence,
Fair Weather Federalism and America's Waste Disposal Crisis, 27 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 71
(2003).
239. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Are Public Facilities Different from Private Ones?:
Adopting a New Standard of Review for the Dormant Commerce Clause, 60 SMU L. REV. 157
(2007); Catherine Gage O'Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Economic
Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 571 (1997).
240. See, e.g., O'Grady, supra note 239, at 575.
241. Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 217, 222.
242. McGreal, supra note 10, at 1194 (arguing that the DCCD "is concerned with state laws
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Court assumes that discrimination between in-state and out-of-state
competitors necessarily harms the welfare of the national economy,"
and, in doing so, "the Court implicitly has adopted a neoclassical
view of economics-that free competition among rational economic
actors will necessarily improve the national economy." '243
A similar criticism was raised against one of the canonical DCCD
cases, H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond,2" in which Justice Robert
Jackson paid powerful tribute to the virtues of the free trade zone
the DCCD was allegedly intended to police, while invalidating a
state refusal to license a milk-receiving station in New York because
of the "destructive competition" it would engender.245 According to
one commentator:
The theoretical, legal, and economic consequences of Jackson's
reasoning ... were enormous. The primary assumptions of the
opinion-that the existing distribution of wealth and the right
of business to expand were "natural"--disjoined economics from
politics. The assumption that society existed apart from its
economic underpinnings shifted control of social processes from
politics to the market. By subordinating politics, society, and the
Constitution to the market, Jackson confirmed the social and
economic status quo. In the process, New York's dairy farmers
were flung back upon that market.
246
These critiques have, as with those levied against balancing,
found champions on the Court itself. Chief Justice Roberts,24 v Chief
that both: (1) discriminate between in-state and out-of-state actors that compete with one
another, and (2) harm the welfare of the national economy").
243. Id. at 1195-96.
244. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
245. Id. at 529.
246. Jack Michel, Comment, Hood v. DuMond. A Study of the Supreme Court and the
Ideology of Capitalism, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 657, 688 (1986).
247. See United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S.
Ct. 1786, 1796, 1798 (2007); see also Dept. Rev. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1809-10 (2008)
(applying United Haulers to uphold a discriminatory tax exemption for income derived from
bonds issued by a state and state's political subdivisions, as opposed to income derived from
private bonds or bonds issued by other states or their political subdivisions).
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Justice Rehnquist,148  and Justice Souter249 have all opposed
particular applications of the antidiscrimination principle on the
ground that it involves the Court in enforcing its own vision of the
market economy at the expense of state and local governments'
visions. As Chief Justice Roberts recently put it, "[tihe dormant
Commerce Clause is not a roving license for federal courts to decide
what activities are appropriate for state and local government to
undertake, and what activities must be the province of private
market competition.""25 His former boss, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
once chided the majority in a DCCD case for its "messianic insis-
tence on a grim sink-or-swim policy of laissez-faire economics. 251
While not necessarily quarreling with the ideological origins of
the rule, one scholar has argued forcefully that the antidiscrim-
ination principle's application is so irredeemably incoherent that it
should be discarded. 2  Professor Edward Zelinsky has further
248. See W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 217 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
249. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 424-25 (1994) (Souter,
J., dissenting) ("No more than the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause 'does not
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics ... [or] embody a particular economic theory,
whether of paternalism ... or of laissez faire.' ... The dormant Commerce Clause does not
'protec[t] the particular structure or methods of operation in a[ny] ... market.' ... The only right
to compete that it protects is the right to compete on terms independent of one's location.")
(quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) and Exxon
Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978))).
250. United Haulers Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. at 1796; see also id. at 1798 ('The Counties'
ordinances are exercises of the police power in an effort to address waste disposal, a typical
and traditional concern of local government. The haulers nevertheless ask us to hold that laws
favoring public entities while treating all private businesses the same are subject to an almost
per se rule of invalidity, because of asserted discrimination. In the alternative, they maintain
that the Counties' laws cannot survive the more permissive Pike test, because of asserted
burdens on commerce. There is a common thread to these arguments: They are invitations
to rigorously scrutinize economic legislation passed under the auspices of the police power.
There was a time when this Court presumed to make such binding judgments for society,
under the guise of interpreting the Due Process Clause. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905). We should not seek to reclaim that ground for judicial
supremacy under the banner of the dormant Commerce Clause.").
251. W Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 217 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ('The wisdom of a
messianic insistence on a grim sink-or-swim policy of laissez-faire economics would be
debatable had Congress chosen to enact it; but Congress has done nothing of the kind. It is
the Court which has imposed the policy under the dormant Commerce Clause, a policy which
bodes ill for the values of federalism which have long animated our constitutional
jurisprudence.").
252. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics, supra note 10.
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argued that the rule-at least in tax cases-no longer "fits" because
a change in background circumstances now renders it useless.253
Professor Zelinsky argues that since the DCCD bars discrimina-
tory taxes, but permits discriminatory cash subsidies despite the
economic equivalence of both, the antidiscrimination principle is
incoherent.2 54 Assuming, as he does, that promotion and mainte-
nance of free trade among the states is the relevant constitutional
operative proposition, 15 permitting subsidies but barring taxes and
other regulations is nonsensical.2 5' Further, he argues that the
process by which taxes are classified as discriminatory or nondis-
criminatory is untenable.2 57 Better doctrinal tools are available to
courts to police state abuses;2 58 if not, then aggrieved parties may
seek redress from Congress.259 Attempting to remedy these problems
by "think[ing] harder" about doctrinal refinements is fruitless.26 °
Better to move on, he concludes, since the problems that spawned
the DCCD are largely a thing of the past.
b. Subterfuge
It is, perhaps, a measure of the antidiscrimination principle's loss
of fit that the Court seems willing to employ subterfuge in many
cases that seem to call for its employ. In this Part, I look at three
pairs of cases, all with similar facts, which nevertheless produced
opposite results. These pairs of cases suggest that something other
than the rules laid down by the Court are driving their outcomes.
253. See id. at 31; see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler: A Critique, 34
STATE TAX NOTES 37 (2003); Edward A. Zelinsky, Ohio Incentives Decision Revisited, 37 STATE
TAX NOTES 850 (2005). For a response, see Brannon P. Denning, Is the Dormant Commerce
Clause Expendable? A Reply to Edward Zelinsky, 77 MISS. L.J. 623 (2007).
254. See Zelinsky, Restoring Politics, supra note 10, at 29-30. For a brief restatement of his
position, see Edward A. Zelinsky & Brannon P. Denning, Debate, The Future of the Dormant
Commerce Clause: Abolishing the Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 155 PENNUMBRA
196, 196 (2007), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/commerce-clause.pdf.
255. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics, supra note 10, at 77.
256. Id. at 34.
257. Id. at 36.
258. Id. at 78.
259. Id. at 84-87.
260. Zelinsky & Denning, supra note 254, at 213.
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i. Hunt, Exxon, and Discriminatory Effects
The Court's DCCD cases involving facially neutral statutes
alleged to have discriminatory effects are particularly troublesome
for those who attempt to extrapolate principles from them.26' Two
cases in particular-Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertisers
Commission"' and Exxon v. Maryland263 -decided a year apart,
raise suspicions that the Court was not entirely candid about the
reasons for the respective outcomes.
In Hunt, the Court invalidated a North Carolina regulation
prohibiting the use of state grading systems on closed containers of
apples, allegedly as a consumer protection measure.264 The effect
was to prohibit the use of the grading system Washington had
developed, which was acknowledged to be superior even to that
of the FDA.2" 5 North Carolina, which had no grading system,
prohibited its use, requiring that containers be marked with the
FDA grade or no grade at all.26 This, the Court recognized,
stripped Washington apples of their competitive advantage, making
North Carolina apples potentially more competitive, and forced
Washington apple growers to bear costs not borne by in-state
apples.267
The facts in the next Term's Exxon case seemed similar. In
response to complaints from independent retail stations that oil
companies and refineries were favoring their own retail stations
over those of independent retailers during the early 1970s' gas
shortages, the Maryland legislature passed a law restructuring the
state's retail gasoline market.268 The law barred producers or
refiners of petroleum products from operating retail service stations
in Maryland.6 9 Maryland had no producers or refiners, and "[a]ll of
261. For one valiant effort, see Brannon P. Denning & Rachel M. Lary, Retail Store Size-
Capping Ordinances and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 37 URB. LAw. 907, 925-36
(2005).
262. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
263. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
264. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353-54.
265. Id. at 336.
266. Id. at 340.
267. Id. at 350-51.
268. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 120.
269. Id. at 120-21, 123.
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the gasoline sold by Exxon in Maryland [was] transported into the
State from refineries located elsewhere. 270
Exxon alleged that, though facially neutral, the statute discrimi-
nated against interstate commerce in its effects by protecting in-
state retail gas stations from competition from those owned by out-
of-state oil producers and refiners. "[Tihe burden of the divestiture
requirements," Exxon noted, fell "solely on interstate companies.
271
In an opinion upholding the law, Justice Stevens replied that who
the law burdened "does not lead, either logically or as a practical
matter, to a conclusion that the State is discriminating against
interstate commerce at the retail level. 272 Stevens distinguished
Hunt, explaining that the Maryland statute "create[d] no barriers
whatsoever against interstate independent dealers; it d[id] not
prohibit the flow of interstate goods, place added costs upon them,
or distinguish between in-state and out-of-state companies in the
retail market. 273
He emphasized the fact that "in-state independent dealers will
have no competitive advantage over out-of-state dealers," though
"refiners will no longer enjoy their same status in the Maryland
market., 274 The simple fact that the burden of this particular
regulation fell on a subset of out-of-state retail dealers did not "by
itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate com-
merce." '275 Only if "the effect of a state regulation is to cause local
goods to constitute a larger share, and goods with an out-of-state
source to constitute a smaller share, of the total sales in the
market," Stevens added in a footnote, might "the regulation [be
found to] have a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. 27 6
Because the regulation did not affect the "relative proportions of
local and out-of-state goods sold in Maryland and ... [had] no
demonstrable effect ... on the interstate flow of goods," the statute
was valid.277
270. Id. at 121.
271. Id. at 125.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 126.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 116 n.16.
277. Id.
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Exxon, on similar facts, seemed to change the rules laid down in
Hunt, or at least applied them differently. North Carolina's regu-
lation was facially neutral as well. Washington apple growers who
complied with its terms could have imported into North Carolina
and competed with that state's apples. Further, the Court had not
required the Washington apple growers to prove that North
Carolina's regulations reduced the interstate flow of apples. Some
of the Court's claims in Exxon, moreover-for example, that the
relevant comparison for the effects of the statute was between in-
state and out-of-state independent retail sellers, as opposed to all
retailers of gasoline (which would include the refiner-owned gas
stations)-seem arbitrary and difficult to defend.278
What explains the difference between Exxon and Hunt? Professor
Regan thought that the Court was simply convinced that a protec-
tionist purpose lay behind North Carolina's statute, but not Mary-
land's.279 Dan Coenen has suggested that what the Court was really
up to was concluding that the prevention of vertical integration in
the petroleum industry was a "legitimate" interest that could not be
achieved in a less discriminatory way.28 ° Perhaps, as a commentator
in the Harvard Law Review argued, the Court felt the oil companies
could take care of themselves in the political arena.28' Whatever the
278. Justice Blackmun put it well in his lone dissent:
To accept the argument of the Court, that is, that discrimination must be
universal to offend the Commerce Clause, naively will foster protectionist
discrimination against interstate commerce. In the future, States will be able to
insulate in-state interests from competition by identifying the most potent
segments of out-of-state business, banning them, and permitting less effective
out-of-state actors to remain. The record shows that the Court permits Maryland
to effect just such discrimination in this case. The State bans the most powerful
out-of-state firms from retailing gasoline within its boundaries. It then insulates
the forced divestiture of 199 service stations from constitutional attack by
permitting out-of-state firms ... to operate 34 gasoline stations. Effective out-of-
state competition is thereby emasculated-no doubt, an ingenious discrim-
ination. But as stated at the outset, "the commerce clause forbids discrimination,
whether forthright or ingenious."
Id. at 147 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455
(1941)).
279. Regan, supra note 10, at 1236 ("Stevens says North Carolina discriminated and
Maryland does not. There is only one thing he can possibly have in mind, namely, that the
North Carolina legislature was motivated by protectionist purpose, while the Maryland
legislature was not.").
280. COENEN, supra note 10, at 282 n.81.
281. The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1, 74 (1978) (commenting that "it
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explanation, the reasons given for distinguishing Hunt are uncon-
vincing enough to suggest strongly that one or more unarticulated
reasons for the holding dictated the outcome.
ii. Missing Linkages: West Lynn Creamery and Walsh
In another discriminatory effects case, West Lynn Creamery v.
Healy,"2 the Court invalidated a Massachusetts tax-subsidy
combination that imposed a facially neutral tax on all milk sales;
tax revenue then funded a special subsidy given only to Massachu-
setts dairy farmers.2"3 The result was that only out-of-state produc-
ers paid the tax; the effect of the combined tax and subsidy rendered
the scheme unconstitutional.2"
A few years later, Maine sought to provide relief to its citizens
from high prescription drug prices using a similar scheme.2"5 Maine
taxed the sale of drugs by manufacturers and retail sellers, placed
the funds in a dedicated fund, and used those funds to reimburse
retailers for selling discounted drugs.2"' Retailers also received
additional money for participating in the program.2"7 The effect
appeared to be that out-of-state drug manufacturers paid the tax,
whereas retail sellers had their tax rebated, just like the in-state
dairy farmers in West Lynn Creamery.2"
The Court rejected the analogy. "West Lynn," wrote Justice
Stevens, "[wa]s ... not applicable to this case" because
is difficult to believe that [Exxon and other oil companiesl viewpoint was not represented
before the Maryland legislature. Realistically viewed, major oil companies are unlikely
candidates for the role of the voiceless out-of-state business").
282. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
283. Id. at 190-91.
284. Id. at 194 (noting that taxes paid by Massachusetts farmers were "entirely-indeed
more than-offset by the subsidy provided exclusively to Massachusetts dairy farmers"). See
generally Dan T. Coenen & Walter Hellerstein, Suspect Linkage: The Interplay of State Taxing
and Spending Measures in the Application of Constitutional Antidiscrimination Rules, 95
MICH. L. REV. 2167 (1997).
285. See generally Brannon P. Denning, The Maine Rx Prescription Drug Plan and the
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: The Case of the Missing Link/age], 29 AM. J.L. & MED.
7 (2003).
286. Id. at 9-10.
287. See generally id.
288. Id. at 9-10, 22-27.
20081 467
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
[u] nlike the situation in West Lynn... the Maine Rx Program will
not impose a disparate burden on any competitors. A manufac-
turer could not avoid its rebate obligation by opening production
facilities in Maine and would receive no benefit from the rebates
even if it did so; the payments to the local pharmacists provide
no special benefit to competitors of rebate-paying manufactur-
ers.
2 89
But those taxed and those subsidized in West Lynn were not, strictly
speaking, competitors either. Chief Justice Rehnquist had com-
plained in West Lynn that "the Court [was] strik[ing] down this
method of state subsidization because the nondiscriminatory tax
levied against all milk dealers is coupled with a subsidy to milk
producers.29 °
Although they were not competitors, the labelers and out-of-state
manufacturers were precise proxies for in-state and out-of-state
interests. Both were subject to the facially neutral tax, but only the
in-state labelers received the "prescription fee" generated by the tax.
In addition, out-of-state drug manufacturers (the only kind there
were) were being taxed to subsidize a benefit given both to the
residents receiving the discounted drugs, as well as the in-state
pharmacists supplying them. Although the tax caught 'labelers"-
in-state retailers-the labelers benefited from the prescription fee
they received out of the designated fund. The money flowing to the
pharmacists who were both (nominally) subject to the tax, as well
as responsible for administering the program, likely helped mollify
the in-state retailers. In West Lynn this purchase of in-state
quiescence was one reason the majority struck the program down.
Justice Stevens wrote that
when a nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a subsidy to one
of the groups hurt by the tax, a State's political processes can no
longer be relied upon to prevent legislative abuse, because one
of the in-state interests which would otherwise lobby against the
tax has been mollified by the subsidy.29'
289. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 670 (2003).
290. W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 214 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
291. Id. at 200 (majority opinion).
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Perhaps as in Exxon, members of the Court felt the pharmaceutical
companies should be able to take care of themselves, but it again
failed to announce a categorical exception to that effect.
iii. Flow Control Ordinances and Forced-use Rules: C & A
Carbone and United Haulers
In 2007, the Court decided United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority,"' in which it created
a heretofore unknown exception to the antidiscrimination rule: the
rule does not apply if a state or local government discriminates in
favor of a publicly owned facility-here a waste disposal unit that
all persons served by the waste management district were obliged
to use to process their garbage.293 The outcome in United Haulers
was in tension with an earlier case, C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown,294 in which the Court invalidated a very similar flow
control ordinance. The difference was that in Carbone, the waste
disposal site was (nominally) privately owned.295
But there is much less to this publicly/privately owned distinction
than meets the eye. As Justice Souter noted in his Carbone dissent,
and as Justice Alito noted in his United Haulers dissent, the
Clarkstown facility was built and initially operated by a private
firm, but was to be "sold" to the City for a nominal amount after a
period of years during which the private firm would recoup its
investment.296 Justice Alito argued that the Carbone majority had
seen the private-public distinction as irrelevant in its decision to
invalidate the ordinance.297
Nevertheless, the United Haulers majority held that as the
public-private issue had not been squarely before the Court in
292. 127 S. Ct. 1786 (2007); see also Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1809-10
(2008) (applying United Haulers to uphold a discriminatory tax exemption for income derived
from bonds issued by a state and state's political subdivisions, as opposed to income derived
from private bonds or bonds issued by other states or their political subdivisions).
293. Id. at 1795 ("[W]e decide that ... flow control ordinances [discriminating in favor of a
public facility] do not discriminate against interstate commerce for purposes of the dormant
Commerce Clause.").
294. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
295. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1804 (AUto, J., dissenting).
296. Id.; Carbone, 511 U.S. at 419 (Souter, J., dissenting).
297. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1805 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Carbone, that case did not control.29 The majority justified exempt-
ing public entities from the strictures of the DCCD on several
grounds, including: (1) the responsibility of governments to protect
the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens that private entities
do not exercise;2 99 (2) the presence of legitimate non-protectionist
goals furthered by such forced-use rules, aside from "simple
economic protectionism";3 °0 (3) respect for federalism, especially
where traditional government functions were involved;3"' and (4)
that "the most palpable harm imposed by the ordinances-more
expensive trash removal-is likely to fall upon the very people who
voted for the laws. 3 °2
Justice Alito responded that merely reciting a police power
justification for a law has never insulated state action from scrutiny
under the DCCD. °3 Likewise, under the Court's prior cases, the
mere fact that some in-state interests were harmed as well did not
immunize the flow control ordinance. °4 Moreover, he doubted that
governments would be less likely to succumb to simple "economic
protectionism" when favoring public entities as opposed to private
ones.305 Finally, he expressed surprise at the reappearance of the
'traditional' governmental function" argument, which the Court
had discarded as unworkable in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
298. Id. at 1795 ("Carbone cannot be regarded as having decided the public-private
question.").
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1795-96.
301. Id. at 1796 ('The dormant Commerce Clause is not a roving license for federal courts
to decide what activities are appropriate for state and local government to undertake, and
what activities must be the province of private market competition.... We should be
particularly hesitant to interfere with the Counties' efforts under the guise of the Commerce
Clause because '[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government
function."' (quoting United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkmer Solid Waste Mgm't Auth.,
261 F.3d 245, 264 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, J., concurring))).
302. Id. at 1797.
303. Id. at 1809-10 (Alito, J., dissenting).
304. Id. at 1811 (noting that if legislation were discriminatory, "then regardless ofwhether
those harmed by it reside entirely outside the State in question, the law is subject to strict
scrutiny.").
305. Id. at 1808 ("Experience in other countries, where state ownership is more common
than it is in this country, teaches that governments often discriminate in favor of state-owned
businesses (by shielding them from international competition) precisely for the purpose of
protecting those who derive economic benefits from those businesses, including their
employees.").
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Transit Authority."6 In sum, he concluded, "[t]he public-private
distinction drawn by the Court is both illusory and without prece-
dent. 3 °7
c. Major Calcification
The reluctance to apply the antidiscrimination principle in full
seems to proceed from uncertainty as to its scope and discomfort
with the implications of enforcing the principle to its conceptual
limits. Lingering doubts about the principle's constitutional
pedigree, too, lurk in the background of these cases. Is antidis-
crimination really a constitutional command, or is it merely a
decision rule articulated to enforce some other, unarticulated
constitutional value, such as ensuring that the political process is
open or enforcing a constitutional preference for free trade?
Take, for example, the common assumption that the antidis-
crimination principle is rooted in the Framers' preference for free
trade-that the "very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create
an area of free trade among the several States."3 8 Justice White
once wrote that the "antidiscrimination principle 'follows inexorably
from the basic purpose of the [Commerce] Clause' to prohibit the
multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive of the free
commerce anticipated by the Constitution."3 9 The Court's duty is "to
make the delicate adjustment between the national interest in free
and open trade and the legitimate interest of the individual States
in exercising their taxing powers." 10
306. Id. at 1810-11. Garcia can be found at 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
307. United Haulers Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. at 1804 (Alito, J., dissenting).
308. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370 (1976) (quoting McLeod v. J.
E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944)); see also Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n,
429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977) ("It is now established beyond dispute that 'the Commerce Clause
was not merely an authorization to Congress to enact laws for the protection and
encouragement of commerce among the States, but by its own force created an area of trade
free from interference by the States."); id. at 329 ('The prohibition against discriminatory
treatment of interstate commerce follows inexorably from the basic purpose of the Clause.
Permitting the individual States to enact laws that favor local enterprises at the expense of
out-of-state businesses 'would invite a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive'
of the free trade which the Clause protects.").
309. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 754 (1981) (quoting Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S.
at 329).
310. Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 329 (emphasis added).
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Reasoning from that premise, the Court was soon defining
"discriminatory" to include the use of "state taxes to burden
commerce in other States in an attempt to induce 'business
operations to be performed in the home State that could more
efficiently be performed elsewhere,"'311 and condemning the "distort-
ing" effects of tariff-like regulations.312 In West Lynn Creamery v.
Healy,"3 to cite another example, Justice Stevens described the "the
protective tariff or customs duty" as "[t]he paradigmatic example of
a law discriminating against interstate commerce. 3 4 Its constitu-
tional infirmity, wrote Stevens, was that a tariff had "distorting
effects on the geography of production"--it "violate[d] the principle
of the unitary national market by handicapping out-of-state
competitors, thus artificially encouraging in-state production even
when the same goods could be produced at lower cost in other
States.315
In other words, where constitutional command is framed in terms
of preserving free trade through a nondiscrimination principle, the
Court subsequently articulated decision rules that promoted
economic efficiency or sought to eliminate taxes and regulations
with "distorting" effects on economic decisionmaking. One influen-
tial article, in fact, argued that the antidiscrimination principle
prohibited state investment incentives that "subvert[ed] the
allocative functions of the market and divert[ed] business activity
from its economically most efficient location. ,3 " The "distorting"-
or, to use another adjective, "coercive"-effects of such incentives
were cited by the Sixth Circuit in the celebrated Cuno case, 317 in
which Ohio's investment tax credit for expanding in-state business
operations was held to violate the DCCD."'
311. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 406 (1984) (quoting Boston Stock
Exch., 429 U.S. at 336). For other cases quoting Pike's "efficiency" language, see Granholm v.
Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 475 (2005); S.-Cent. Timber Co. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984);
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Co., 426 U.S. 794, 821 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
312. See infra notes 313-15 and accompanying text.
313. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
314. Id. at 193.
315. Id.
316. Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on
State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 423 (1997).
317. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 743 (6th Cir. 2004), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. DaimlerChrysler, Inc. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
318. Id. (holding that state taxpayer plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit). Professor
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Yet, cast in such strong terms, the antidiscrimination principle
does begin to resemble economic substantive due process. Surely a
wide range of state activities-from school funding, to infrastructure
investment, to tax policy--could "distort" the "efficient" allocation
of business activity among states. Labeling such interstate differ-
ences as "discriminatory" and policing them through the DCCD
would involve a radical expansion of the doctrine, and would
empower the federal judiciary to superintend vast swaths of state
and local economic policy. That the Court is alert to such dangers is
evidenced by its apparent retreat from its more expansive versions
of the antidiscrimination rule.
The Court has not, however, pulled back far enough for Justice
Thomas. No current member of the Court-not even Justice Scalia-
is as opposed to the DCCD as Justice Thomas. Justice Scalia, albeit
grudgingly, is willing to concede the legitimacy of the antidis-
crimination principle in at least some cases,31 reserving the
"illegitimate" label for Pike balancing. ° Early in his career, Justice
Thomas joined opinions in which the Court applied the antidis-
crimination principle,321 and even once proposed a textual substi-
tute, the Import-Export Clause, for the DCCD,322 or at least some of
Enrich was plaintiffs counsel in Cuno.
319. He has recently emphasized his qualification that he will enforce the DCCD only in
situations "indistinguishable" from those the Court has encountered in previous cases:
I have been willing to enforce on stare decisis grounds a "negative" self-executing
Commerce Clause in two situations: "(1) against a state law that facially
discriminates against interstate commerce, and (2) against a state law that is
indistinguishable from a type of law previously held unconstitutional by the
Court."
United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786,
1798 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 210 (Scalia, J.,
concurring)). Justice Scalia believes that the "real" antidiscrimination principle is found in
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article I, Section 2. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State
Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 264-65 (1986) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
320. See, e.g., United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1799 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I am unable to
join Part II-D of the principal opinion, in which the plurality performs so-called 'Pike
balancing.' Generally speaking, the balancing of various values is left to Congress-which is
precisely what the Commerce Clause (the real Commerce Clause) envisions.").
321. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Denning,
supra note 124, at 218-19 (discussing cases in which Justice Thomas wrote or joined opinions
applying the antidiscrimination principle).
322. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 621 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (urging adoption of the Import-Export Clause to replace the DCCD);
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it.32 3 In 2003, however, Justice Thomas moved past Justice Scalia
and urged a total rejection of the entire doctrine. 24
In his United Haulers concurrence, Justice Thomas explicitly
repudiated his youthful acquiescence to the DCCD325 -the
antidiscrimination principle in particular-and explained in some
detail why he had taken the step of renouncing the doctrine
completely. 'The language of the [Commerce] Clause," he explains,
"allows Congress not only to regulate interstate commerce but also
to prevent state regulation of interstate commerce., 2 ' But the Court
has "interpreted the Commerce Clause as a tool for courts to strike
down state laws that it believes inhibit interstate commerce. 3 2' The
problem is that "there is no basis in the Constitution for that
interpretation., 32 ' He argued that the Court knows this, which is
why it is forced to appeal to stare decisis whenever it invokes the
DCCD.329
By invoking earlier decisions, however, the Court is building its
doctrinal house on sand.330 Earlier decisions, Justice Thomas con-
tinued, were "premised upon the notion that the Commerce Clause
is an exclusive grant of power to Congress over certain subject
areas,"331 while "the modern jurisprudence focuses upon the way in
which States regulate those subjects to decide whether the regula-
tion is permissible, 332 prohibiting discriminatory state regulations
while permitting nondiscriminatory ones.
But policing discrimination is no more satisfying a basis for the
doctrine, argued Justice Thomas, because "none of the cases the
see also Denning, supra note 124, at 215-23 (critiquing Justice Thomas's proposal).
323. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 637-40 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(indicating that Import-Export Clause would apply only to taxes analogous to "[imposts and
duties"); Denning, supra note 124, at 220-23 (noting consequences of narrowing the DCCD).
324. See, e.g., United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1799 (Thomas, J., concurring) ('The negative
Commerce Clause has no basis in the Constitution and has proved unworkable in practice.").
325. Id. ("Although I joined C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, I no longer believe it was
correctly decided.") (citation omitted).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. (mentioning the Court's citations to Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 232 (1873), and Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852)).
329. See id. at 1799-1800.
330. Id. at 1799.
331. Id. at 1800.
332. Id.
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Court cites explains how the absence or presence of discrimination
is relevant to deciding whether the ordinances are constitutionally
permissible, and at least one case affirmatively admits that the
nondiscrimination rule has no basis in the Constitution." ' The best
the Court can do is gesture vaguely in the direction of some alleged
purpose of the Framers.334 Thus, he concludes, "cloaked in the
'purpose' of the Commerce Clause, the rule against discrimination
that the Court applies ... exists untethered from the written
Constitution [and] instead depends upon the policy preferences of
a majority of this Court." '35
Justice Thomas then noted the different ways in which the Court
had articulated the purpose behind the antidiscrimination principle.
In the earlier years, the Court would speak of the purpose as the
prevention of the harmful effects of statutes on interstate commerce
itself,33 while "[miore recently, the Court has struck down state
laws sometimes based on its preference for national unity,33 v and
at "other times on the basis of antiprotectionist sentiment.""33 What
those disparate justifications have in common, Justice Thomas
argues, is "the erroneous assumption that the Court must choose
between economic protectionism and the free market." '339 On the
contrary, wrote Justice Thomas, that choice is Congress's and,
lacking its pronouncement on a subject, "the States are free to set
the balance between protectionism and the free market. 34 °
The upshot, he concluded, is an illegitimate and unprincipled
doctrine, enforcing an illusory constitutional command found
nowhere in the text.341 In short, it has become a contemporary ana-
logue to Lochner v. New York. 342 "The Court's negative Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, created from whole cloth, is just as illegiti-
mate as the 'right' it vindicated in Lochner.343 He chided the United
333. Id.
334. Id. at 1799-1800.
335. Id. at 1800.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 1801.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 1802. Lochner can be found at 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
343. United Haulers Assn, 127 S. Ct. at 1802 (Thomas, J., concurring).
20081 475
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Haulers majority for "propagat[ing] the error by narrowing the
[DCCD] for policy reasons ... that later majorities of this Court may
find to be entirely illegitimate. ' 44
One need look only at cases decided within the last two decades
to see signs of the minor calcification Roosevelt described.3 41
Balancing and the antidiscrimination principle, both seen as
superior decision rules at one time, are now attacked as resting on
controversial assumptions, ill-suited once taken to their logical
conclusions, or both.
Balancing, long a target of DCCD critics, is said to presume an
inappropriate role for courts and is built on a questionable value
judgment.3 46 To its critics, rigid application of the antidiscrimination
principle also belies an unarticulated and questionable belief: that
the Constitution embodies a preference for free trade qua free
trade-for markets over regulation.
Furthermore, the more one attempts to reconcile DCCD cases
with similar facts, but divergent results, the more one feels that the
facile distinctions offered are intended to mask the "real" reasons for
the decisions. Such subterfuge has, as Roosevelt noted, resulted in
confusion among judges, litigants, and commentators alike.347 In
many cases it appears that everything is driving the result except
the doctrinal rules laid down in prior cases.
The presence of minor calcification would be enough to justify
revisiting the DCCD's decision rules.3 4 More disturbing are
powerful critiques suggesting that major calification-the conflation
of constitutional operative proposition with decision rules-is also
infecting the doctrine. 49 Justice Thomas's United Haulers concur-
rence took aim at the DCCD's Achilles' Heel: its lack of convincing
(or at least a consistently stated) constitutional authority.350 The
Court's failure from the beginning to settle on a constitutional
344. Id. at 1803.
345. See Roosevelt, supra note 14.
346. See supra Parts II.E, III.B.1.
347. See supra Part III.A.1.
348. See supra Part III.A.1.
349. See supra Part III.A.2.
350. See United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S.
Ct. 1786, 1799-1802 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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operative proposition doomed it to lurch from decision rule to
decision rule, resulting in the DCCD's notorious confusion and
incoherence.351 The contemporary two-tiered standard of review is
merely the latest product of this fundamental omission.352 Over
time, as Roosevelt observed, decision rules themselves can be-
come so familiar that courts (and scholars) erroneously assume
that, by applying them, the Court is doing what the Constitution
commands.353 Further compounding error, courts and scholars have
derived some DCCD decision rules from earlier decision rules,
taking the doctrine further and further from the constitutional
command. 54
In Part IV, I take up Justice Thomas's challenge. There is a
constitutional basis for the DCCD, or at least for part of it, though
he is correct that several justifications cited by the Court are not
defensible. Part IV surveys and critiques contemporary constitu-
tional justifications for the DCCD and offers an operative proposi-
tion, grounded in the Framers' intent to secure political union by
removing obstacles to it, and to prevent economic predation among
the states in particular. Building on the union-protecting theory of
the DCCD, I will then offer decision rules for its implementation.
IV. CONSTRUCTING A DECISION RULES MODEL OF THE DCCD
Drawing on an earlier article, I first propose a more limited-yet
more historically defensible--constitutional basis for the DCCD,
superior to others the Court has offered in the past. I then discuss
the factors that inform the design of decision rules. Finally, I
construct new decision rules for the DCCD that implement the
operative proposition. Although these rules tend to follow the
Court's lead in prescribing strict scrutiny for laws violating the
antidiscrimination rule, they depart from the current decision rules
in two respects: (i) I would abandon Pike balancing, since it cannot
be satisfactorily tied to the operative proposition offered here, and
fares poorly under the evaluative criteria scholars have proposed for
constitutional doctrine; and (ii) I would exempt from the definition
351. See supra Parts I-1H.A.
352. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
353. See supra Part IIIA.
354. See supra Part II.E.
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of "discriminatory" those laws that do not risk retaliation by other
states, thus potentially undermining political union.
A. The Constitutional Operative Proposition
Professor Berman's article does not have very much to say about
deriving the constitutional operative proposition.35 5 It would be very
easy for such a debate-involving as it does the whole range of
questions regarding the legitimacy of various modalities of constitu-
tional interpretation-to have hijacked his original paper. The same
is true here. However, one must have some account (and defense) of
a constitutional operative proposition, as the rules proceed from it.
Part of the DCCD's problem is that the Court has never settled on
one operative proposition. The Court has offered several contenders;
it sometimes offers more than one in the same opinion. The Court's
reluctance to settle on the constitutional basis for the DCCD, and its
conflation of the decision rules and operative propositions, have both
sown confusion throughout the doctrine's history, and left it
vulnerable to charges, like Justice Thomas's, that the entire
doctrine lacks any constitutional basis and is thus illegitimate.356
1. Critiquing the Court's Modern Contenders
The Court has flirted with several possible constitutional bases
for the DCCD. The doctrine's early history saw the proponents of
exclusive and concurrent power contend for dominance before both
were replaced by Cooley's rule of selective exclusivity.3 57 In its
355. See Berman, supra note 11.
356. See United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S.
Ct. 1786, 1799-1802 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
357. See supra Part II. In his earliest critique of the DCCD, Justice Thomas alleged that
the Court had historically relied on two justifications for the doctrine that, he pointedly noted,
lacked any textual foundation. The first, which he wrote was likely "wrong from the outset,"
was the theory of exclusivity discussed above. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 612 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). The second theory Justice
Thomas cited was the "pre-emption-by-silence" theory (that because Congress retained
affirmative power over commerce, its inaction on regulatory matters implicitly preempted
state action). Id. at 614-15 (citing Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 493
(1887)). "To the extent that the 'pre-emption-by-silence' rationale ever made sense," he
commented, "it, too, has long since been rejected by this Court in virtually every analogous
area of the law." Id. at 615. That, he argued, left the DCCD without any "theoretical
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articulation of the modern doctrine, however, the Court has moved
away from exclusivity, in favor of other justifications. It has never
settled on one; however, various Justices have advanced differing
justifications, sometimes in the same opinion. Two are variations of
an historical argument; the third is a structural, "political process"
justification.
a. The Framers, Free Trade, and the Commerce Clause
In a number of cases, the Court has claimed that it was the
Framers' intent that the courts enforce something like the DCCD
against the states. This justification, however, comes in two distinct
varieties. According to one form of this historical argument, the
intent was to ensure that the rivalries that had so riven the states
during the Confederation Era were not renewed. The Framers
wanted to ensure the success of the new Union by "avoid[ing] the
tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued
relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the
Articles of Confederation."358 Justice Jackson often wrote of "[t]he
unedifying story of Colonial rivalry in preying upon commerce,
which more than any one thing made our Federal Constitution a
necessity." '359 Justice Cardozo had earlier expressed the opinion that,
foundation." Id. at 617. In his latest assault on the DCCD, Justice Thomas has tended to stick
to his criticism that the DCCD is without a textual foundation in the Constitution. See United
Haulers Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. at 1799 (Thomas, J., concurring). As well he should: the two
theoretical foundations he said had collapsed had been abandoned by the Court long before
Camps Newfound. In that case, Justice Stevens endorsed the more modest "selective
exclusivity" theory of the DCCD:
We have subsequently endorsed Justice Johnson's appraisal of the central
importance of federal control over interstate and foreign commerce and, more
narrowly, his conclusion that the Commerce Clause had not only granted
Congress express authority to override restrictive and conflicting commercial
regulations adopted by the States, but that it also had immediately effected a
curtailment of state power.
Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 571 (majority opinion). No Court in recent memory has
endorsed the preemption-by-silence rationale. Justice Thomas's criticisms are red herrings
here. Even his argument that Federalist No. 32's discussion of exclusive and concurrent
powers proves that no preclusive effect was intended is open to serious question. See generally
Brannon P. Denning, The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine and Constitutional Structure
(Feb. 19, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_ id=260830.
358. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979).
359. Indep. Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70, 94 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting);
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in the Commerce Clause, the Framers embodied the belief that "the
peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that
in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not
division.""36 This is the version I endorse, as I explain below.
But there is another version of the historical argument that is
broader than the "preventing economic Balkanization" argument. In
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell,"1 for example, Justice
Brennan wrote that '"[t]he very purpose of the Commerce Clause
was to create an area of free trade among the several States."'36 2
Later, Justice White, echoing Justice Brennan, wrote that it was
"now established beyond dispute that 'the Commerce Clause was
not merely an authorization to Congress to enact laws for the
protection and encouragement of commerce among the States, but
by its own force created an area of trade free from interference by
the States.' 33 The difference is that this historical justification
tends to assume the Framers valued free trade as an end in and of
itself, as opposed to a means to an end, such as the prevention of
economic friction among states that led to political instability.
As noted earlier, with free trade or economic efficiency as a
constitutional command, decision rules must then be crafted to
implement those values. 64 Such decision rules would make the
DCCD virtually indistinguishable from Lochner's economic substan-
tive due process regime. Consequences aside, the free trade theory
of the DCCD is almost surely wrong as a historical matter.
see also H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 534 (1949) ("[Wlant of a general
power over Commerce led to an exercise of this power separately, by the States, [which] not
only proved abortive, but engendered rival, conflicting and angry regulations."); id. at 533
("When victory relieved the Colonies from the pressure for solidarity that war had exerted,
a drift toward anarchy and commercial warfare between states began" that "came to threaten
at once the peace and safety of the Union." (quotation omitted)).
360. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
361. 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
362. Id. at 370 (quoting McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944)).
363. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977) (quoting Freeman
v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946)); see also id. at 329 (arguing that permitting states to enact
protectionist laws "would invite a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive' of the
free trade which the Clause protects") (quoting Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356
(1951)); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 278 n.7 (1977) ("A State is ...
precluded from taking any action which may fairly be deemed to have the effect of impeding
the free flow of trade between the States. (quoting Freeman, 329 U.S. at 252)).
364. See supra Parts I-I1.
480 [Vol. 50:417
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE
It is true that the Framers wanted to centralize power over
interstate commerce, thus constraining state power to pass
commercial regulation to some degree. But wanting to restrain
states implies no attachment to a particular economic school of
thought. As Richard Collins has pointed out-and as I will argue
below-the Framers sought "interstate commercial harmony rather
than market efficiency." '365 They were not doctrinaire free traders,
and the Commerce Clause did not, to paraphrase Holmes, enact Mr.
Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations.6' In my research, I found no
indication that free trade qua free trade lay at the heart of the move
to centralize economic regulation.367
b. The Representation-Reinforcing Justification for the DCCD
The Court has also justified the DCCD in structural, political
process terms. Laurence Tribe succinctly described this approach:
Because regulation unduly burdening or discriminating against
interstate or foreign commerce or out-of-state enterprise has
been thought to result from the inherently limited constituency
to which each state or local legislature is accountable, the
Supreme Court has viewed with suspicion any state action
which imposes special or distinct burdens on out-of-state
interests unrepresented in the state's political process.3
365. Collins, supra note 10, at 64; see also 1 TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1057 ('CThe function
of the clause is to ensure national solidarity, not necessarily economic efficiency."); Eule,
supra note 10, at 429 ('rhe Framers did not explicitly protect free trade.").
366. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
367. Accord Collins, supra note 10, at 114-15 ("Mhe doctrine does not in any meaningful
sense impose laissez faire as a substantive value.").
368. 1 TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1052; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOcRAcY AND DISTRUST:
A THEORY OF JUDIcIAL REVIEW 83-84 (1980). Ely argued that the DCCD grew
out of the ... need to protect the politically powerless and proceeding by the ...
device of guaranteed virtual representation. Thus, for example, early in the
nineteenth century the Court indicated that a state could not subject goods
produced out of state to taxes it did not impose on goods produced locally. By
thus constitutionally binding the interests of out-of-state manufacturers to those
of local manufacturers represented in the legislature, it provided political
insurance that the taxes imposed on the former would not rise to a prohibitive
or even an unreasonable level.
Id. (citation omitted).
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In the 1930s, Chief Justice Stone, in South Carolina State
Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros. 3 9 regarded the fact that the
state weight and width restrictions on vehicles traveling on state
highways were nondiscriminatory and "affect[ed] alike shippers in
interstate and intrastate commerce in large number within as well
as without the state [as] a safeguard against their abuse. '370 Later,
in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,371 for example, Justice
Stevens wrote that the political process that works to prevent
abuses cannot be counted upon to work when a state or local
government imposes costs on out-of-state citizens and confers
benefits on its own citizens. 372 "[A] State's own political processes,"
however, "will serve as a check against unduly burdensome regula-
tions" when such laws are evenhanded, and the burdens fall "on
local economic interest as well as other States' economic
interests. 373 As recently as two Terms ago, Chief Justice Roberts
argued that a facially discriminatory law that forced the use of a
publicly owned facility for the disposal of garbage, thus potentially
raising the costs of garbage disposal to two counties' citizens, was
not unconstitutional because those affected could be counted upon
to prevent abuses.374
Structural restraints inferred from the Constitution and applied
to exercises of state power date from the Marshall Court. Marshall
himself invoked the Constitution's structure in McCulloch v.
Maryland 375 to invalidate state taxation of a federal bank.3 76 But
369. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
370. Id. at 187; see also id. at 185 n.2 ("[W]hen the regulation is of such a character that
its burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be
subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it
affects adversely some interests within the state.").
371. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
372. Id. at 200.
373. Id.; see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981)
(arguing that facially neutral statute barring sale of milk in nonrecyclable plastic containers
not discriminatory in effect or in purpose because interests of out-of-state plastic milk
container manufacturer adequately represented by similarly-situated in-state interests).
374. United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oenida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct.
1786, 1797 (2007) ("Here, the citizens and businesses of the Counties bear the costs of the
ordinances. There is no reason to step in and hand local businesses a victory they could not
obtain through the political process.").
375. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
376. Responding to Maryland's arguments that the state's power to tax was subject to the
discipline of the voters, Chief Justice Marshall responded that such arguments did not apply
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trying to ground the DCCD on a similar theory-that the political
process cannot be depended upon to produce out-of-staters-runs
into serious difficulties.
First, there is the baseline problem: What is the constitutional
threshold for adequate representation of out-of-state interests? And
who in the regulating state is entitled to act as the surrogate for
out-of-staters? Laurence Tribe has warned that
[t]he concept of surrogate representation should be deployed
with care, since its logic cannot easily be contained. Beyond the
commercial interests that may be offended by statutes and
regulations limiting the availability of goods and services
provided by out-of-state concerns, the Court could as easily rely
on the political voice of in-state consumers to challenge such
regulations before they are enacted. 77
He later commented that "a political check in the form of
consumer pressure is theoretically present in every case where
discrimination against the interstate market is alleged." '378 Thus
reliance on it could easily "turn[] traditional Commerce Clause
analysis on its head," because if discrimination raises costs to out-of-
state firms, in-state consumers ought to provide the political check;
if there are no in-state surrogates, Tribe argues that this "comes
very close to being proof that there has been no violation at all,"
because the Court has said that the DCCD protects the market, not
particular firms.379
when the object being taxed was a federal instrumentality.
The people of a State ... give to their government a right of taxing themselves
and their property, and ... prescribe no limits to the exercise of this right, resting
confidently on the interest of the legislator, and on the influence of the
constituents over their representative, to guard them against its abuse. But the
means employed by the government of the Union have no such security, nor is
the right of a State to tax them sustained by the same theory. Those means are
not given by the people of a particular State, not given by the constituents of the
legislature, which claim the right to tax them, but by the people of all the States.
They are given by all, for the benefit of all-and upon theory, should be
subjected to that government only which belongs to all.
Id. at 427-28.
377. 1 TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1055.
378. Id. at 1056.
379. Id. at 1057. For the Court's statement, see Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117,
127-28 (1978) (stating that the DCCD "protects the interstate market, not particular
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The baseline problem, however, is symptomatic of another.
Process theory is intended to surmount the countermajoritarian
difficulty by justifying judicial intervention when democracy
"breaks." But because, at the state and local level, we expect
popularly elected legislators to seek to benefit their citizens,
democracy is not only not broken when they do, it is working
precisely as intended. Professor Tribe puts it well: "Economic
localism cannot be characterized as a symptom of breakdown in
local democratic processes."'8 "Because this defect is routine rather
than exceptional," and "because of the speed with which the
traditional representation-reenforcing model of judicial review
switches from judicial deference to judicial activism in the sphere of
interstate commerce," the Court often tries hard to find in-state
surrogates for out-of-state interests, giving rise to the representa-
tion baseline problems described above."'
2. The Commerce Clause as a Guarantee of Political Union
The "political union" or anti-Balkanization theory of the DCCD is
likely closest to what the Framers intended and what the Constitu-
tion was understood to do." 2 Therefore, I posit the following
constitutional operative proposition: The Constitution restricts
states' abilities to tax or otherwise regulate interstate commerce in
interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome regulations.").
380. 1 TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1054.
381. Id.
382. Without opening an interpretive can of worms, I also want to be clear about what I
regard as relevant in fashioning the proposition for the Commerce Clause and related clauses
in the Constitution. I find that constitutional text and structure, history, and precedent form
the principal (if not the exclusive) sources of evidence about constitutional meaning.
Moreover, I believe that the Court generally should employ such sources to cabin the range
of interpretive possibilities when it adjudicates constitutional questions, as opposed to the
Justices regarding themselves as completely unconstrained in the range of interpretive
choices. Further, insofar as members of the Court at least seem interested in historical
arguments (even if it is not determinative for some Justices), ascertaining a historically based
operative proposition would seem to provide a focal point or least common denominator on
which Justices might agree, even if they ultimately disagree in particular applications. As I
believe that such conventional sources furnish a good sense of what the Framers had in mind
regarding restraints on state power to regulate interstate commerce, I will bracket the more
difficult questions of what to do when conventional sources "run out," or when a stable body
of precedent-perhaps one built on an original misunderstanding of constitutional
meaning-has formed around a constitutional provision or set of provisions.
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ways that tend to undermine the political union established by the
Constitution by adopting measures likely to provoke retaliation by
other states.
An earlier article of mine383 identified instances of interstate
commercial discrimination during the Confederation Era.3" A
number of states discriminated either against goods produced in
other states, or against goods (of whatever origin) imported into the
state from another state, often by charging higher tariffs or imposts
on those out-of-state goods. 8 ' These practices encouraged the
targets of the higher taxes to respond in kind.386 While John Fiske
probably overstated the degree to which states were on the verge of
a shooting war in his influential history The Critical Period in
American History: 1783-1 789,887 the confrontations were occasion-
ally quite sharp.388
The conflicts, which increased as the American economy took a
sharp downturn in the mid-1780s, were worrisome to moderate
nationalists who feared that the constant cycles of discrimination
and retaliation were pulling the new nation apart. 89 Further
exacerbating the effects of these conflicts was the lack of institu-
tional mechanisms at the confederal level to enforce the protections
for interstate commerce provided in the Articles. 9 ° The interstate
conflicts, the possibility that they would increase over time, and
the inability to deal with them at the supra-state level finally
convinced fence-sitters, like James Madison, that systemic reform
383. See generally Brannon P. Denning, Confederation-Era Discrimination Against
Interstate Commerce and the Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 94 KY.
L.J. 37 (2005).
384. Extreme critics of the DCCD have drawn on historians like Merrill Jensen and
William Zornow, who argued that there was really no discrimination during that period, or
that the extent of the discrimination was wildly exaggerated. See id. at 40-43, 67-77.
385. Id. at 59-66.
386. Id. at 62-63, 69-73.
387. JOHN FISKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD IN AMERICAN HISTORY: 1783-1798 (1888).
388. See Denning, supra note 383, at 62-63, 69-72.
389. See id. at 52-59.
390. Early drafts of the Articles contained even stronger protections for interstate
commerce; these were stripped out when the Articles were considered and weaker versions
were substituted. See id. at 78-81. But even the weaker versions, like Article IV, the
forerunner of the Constitution's Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2
were fairly explicit. See id. at 80-81. I regard it as significant that at state sovereignty's high
tide there was recognition of the danger interstate commercial conflicts posed to the union,
and the willingness to infringe upon state sovereignty to prevent such conflicts. Id. at 81.
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was needed.39' Thereafter, Madison became an advocate for
constitutional reform, something he had hesitated to support
before.392
In Philadelphia, the Framers included a number of provisions
limiting state taxing and regulatory power where interstate and
foreign commerce were concerned.393 In addition to specific restric-
tions on states' powers to tax imports and exports39 4 and impose
duties of tonnage,395 the Framers centralized control of interstate
and foreign commerce, including it in Congress's enumerated
powers. 396 But evidence both from Philadelphia and from the
ratification debates-as well as from the early Supreme Court
opinions-suggests that the Framers understood that limits on
state power were implicit in the positive grant to Congress. 397 To the
extent that the commerce power was discussed at all, it was
understood to limit states separate and apart from the specific
restrictions in Article I, Section 10.398
I do not claim that the Framers had a good idea of what form
those limits took, nor that they had thought through the implica-
tions of such limits. It appears that thoughts about the scope of
these limits remained inchoate for some time; Albert Abel found
quite a number of state laws regulating-and even discriminating
against-interstate commerce in the years between the Constitu-
tion's ratification and Gibbons v. Odgen.399 But regardless of
whether the limits went underenforced for a time,4 °° the Framers
391. Id. at 54-59.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 81-90.
394. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. Along with Chief Justices Marshall and Taney and
Justice Thomas, I think that the Import-Export Clause was intended to apply to interstate
as well as foreign commerce. See Denning, supra note 124.
395. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
396. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Control over commerce with the Indian tribes was
centralized as well. Id.
397. See Denning, supra note 383, at 82-85.
398. Id. at 85-88.
399. See Albert S. Abel, Commerce Regulation Before Gibbons v. Ogden.: Interstate
Transportation Enterprise, 18 MISS. L.J. 335 (1947); Albert S. Abel, Commerce Regulation
Before Gibbons v. Ogden: Trade and Traffic, 14 BROOK. L. REV. 215 (1947); Albert S. Abel,
Commerce Regulation Before Gibbons v. Ogden: Interstate Transportation Facilities, 25 N.C.
L. REV. 121 (1946).
400. There is also evidence that states amended their tariff and impost laws following the
Constitution's ratification, which suggests they understood that the new constitution limited
486 [Vol. 50:417
20081 DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE
(and to the extent that their opinions can be canvassed, the
ratifiers) intended there to be some limits. The limits, moreover,
were spawned not by any particular attachment to a free trade
ideology, but rather by a conviction that parochial trade regulation
inevitably caused conflict, and that such conflicts posed a long-term
threat to the health of the Union.4" 1
B. Crafting Decision Rules
Because constitutional norms, even once defined, must be applied
to particular fact situations, courts-the Supreme Court in
particular-have to self-consciously and intentionally generate rules
at the point where constitutional norms meet those facts. Professors
Berman, Roosevelt, and Fallon have a great deal to say about what
these rules look like and what factors influence courts when
designing them.40 2 This subsection will briefly summarize the
criteria common to all three scholars useful for determining the
form a decision rule should take. It will also review Fallon's
taxonomy of common decision rules in constitutional law.
their regulatory and taxing abilities. See Denning, supra note 383, at 73-74.
401. One might reasonably ask whether I am overestimating the danger to the Union
realistically presented by trade disputes. Professor Zelinsky, for one, doubts that there would
be any appreciable threat to national union if courts abandoned the antidiscrimination
principle. See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 10, at 80, 84-87. If this is true, then whatever the
historic pedigree of my constitutional operative proposition, it may make little sense in this
day and age to create a judicially enforced doctrine around such a command. I am not as
sanguine as Professor Zelinsky and others that the absence of significant barriers to trade
among the states is something that can be taken for granted, or that widespread reinstitution
of barriers would pose little or no threat to political stability in the United States. As the
world economy has slowed, for example, commentary abounds on the reemergence of
protectionism. See Bob Davis, Global Ties Under Stress as Nations Grab Power, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 28, 2008, at Al ("The global economy appears to be entering an epoch in which
governments are reasserting their role in the lives of individuals and businesses. Once again,
barriers are rising."); see also Brannon P. Denning, Is the Dormant Commerce Clause
Expendable? A Response to Edward Zelinsky, 77 MISS. L.J. 623, 644-45 nn.92-94 (2007)
(collecting news articles about resurgent protectionism in the U.S., Europe, and Asia). Absent
the DCCD, I do not think it too dystopian to predict that state and local governments, too,
would seek to impose costs on outsiders. I am confident, then, that the Framers' efforts to
ensure that trade wars not be permitted to introduce tensions between states continues to
have relevance today. Whether my fears (and theirs) are overblown could ultimately be proven
only by disabling the DCCD and seeing what happens, which I would be unwilling to do.
402. See FALLON, supra note 23, at 47-52; Berman, supra note 11, at 92-96; Roosevelt,
supra note 14, at 1658-67.
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1. General Considerations in Decision Rule Formation
In theory, a Court has three options when designing decision
rules. First, it may attempt to enforce the operative proposition
directly, crafting a decision rule that corresponds perfectly to the
Constitution's command. For example, Justice Black thought the
First Amendment "without deviation, without exception, without
any ifs, buts, or whereases, [meant] that government shall not do
anything to people ... either for the views they have or the views
they express or the words they speak or write.""4 3 He was unwilling
to endorse decision rules in First Amendment cases that deviated
from "the clear wording of the First Amendment that 'Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of the speech or of the
press."'4 °4 Justice Black criticized his colleagues for refusing to grant
speech the absolute protection it received under his reading of the
Constitution and instead "adopt[ing] various judicial tests which are
applied on a case-by-case basis to determine if the speech in
question is entitled to protection."4 5
As Professor Roosevelt has demonstrated, though, however
normatively attractive the "direct enforcement" model of the
Constitution is, it simply is not how the Constitution is interpreted
in practice.40 ' Moreover, it is not clear that direct enforcement is
even possible in a wide range of cases.40 v With direct enforcement
impossible in a large number of cases, the choice left open to courts
is whether to craft doctrine-that is, decision rules-that either
defer to other decisionmakers, thereby risking "underenforcement"
403. HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 45 (1968).
404. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
405. Id. at 49-50.
406. See KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 15 (2006) (noting that
Court critics often contrast direct enforcement with judicial activism); see also FALLON, supra
note 23, at 43 ("In 'ordinary' cases the Court-or at least a majority-treats the issue for
decision as framed by established doctrine. Interestingly and significantly, the Justices
assume that their obligation of fidelity to the Constitution is met by fidelity to an established
structure for implementing the Constitution.").
407. ROOSEVELT, supra note 406, at 15-18 (giving examples, and concluding that "a judge
cannot simply enforce the plain meaning of the Constitution" because "the clear meaning
exists at a relatively high level of generality"); see also FALLON, supra note 23, at 42 (noting
that most constitutional norms "are too vague to serve as rules of law; their effective
implementation requires the crafting of doctrine by courts").
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of constitutional commands,4" 8 or employ less deferential rules,
which run the risk of "overenforcing" those commands.40 9 "Doctrine,"
writes Professor Roosevelt, "is the nitty-gritty of constitutional
adjudication. It is the set of rules that the Supreme Court creates to
take it from the grand language of the Constitution to the actual
outcomes of particular cases. 41 °
2. Criteria for Fashioning Decision Rules
As Professor Fallon describes the task, creating doctrine or
decision rules requires the Court to "draw on psychology, sociology,
and economics to craft doctrines that will work in practice, without
excessive costs, and that will prove democratically acceptable." '411
He, Berman, and Roosevelt furnish similar criteria for use in
formulating decision rules. First, there are institutional competence
concerns: whether or not in the ordinary run of cases the Court
would be better off deferring to, say, legislatures, because of the
Court's doubts that it is in the best position to "get the right
answer."
412
Institutional competence concerns are closely linked to the
ability of the Court to reduce error costs. These can result from its
invalidation of laws that ought to be upheld (false positives) or
from upholding laws that should have been invalidated (false
negatives).413 Professor Berman lumps different sorts of error costs
into a similar criteria that he calls "adjudicatory considerations"
addressed to minimizing "adjudicatory errors. 41 4 Although decision
rules ought to seek optimal deterrence, thereby "reducing viola-
"1415tions of constitutional meaning, care must be taken that "the
408. The classic article on underenforcement is Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
409. See generally David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
190 (1988); see also Berman, supra note 11, at 133-36 (discussing the complexity inherent in
determining whether a particular decision rule overprotects or overenforces a constitutional
operative proposition).
410. ROOSEVELT, supra note 406, at 19.
411. FALLON, supra note 23, at 77.
412. ROOSEVELT, supra note 406, at 24-25.
413. Id. at 29-30.
414. Berman, supra note 11, at 93.
415. Id. Berman's example is the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. Id. at 93-94.
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adjudicatory process not render other actors unduly timid." '416
Berman terms these "protective considerations. 41 v
At the same time, a court should be sensitive to fiscal consider-
ations, which Professor Berman defines as those that "drive[] a
court to craft doctrine in such a way as to reduce ... private and
public litigation-related expenditures.""4 8 Fiscal considerations
might-to take an example Roosevelt uses-lead a court to prefer
rules over standards in some cases, providing those they govern
with predictability and stability.419 Decision rules should also seek
to minimize friction with other branches-Berman terms these
institutional considerations-as well as best "operationaliz[e]
constitutional norms or policies"--Berman calls these substantive
considerations.42o
Roosevelt also urges attention to the lessons of history and defects
in democracy as influencing the choice among deferential and non-
deferential decision rules.421 For example, scrutiny of classifications
under the Fourteenth Amendment can be aided by history, which
"might show that certain kinds of discrimination have frequently
been used for improper purposes in the past.... This history justifies
the Court in not deferring to the legislative judgment that such
discrimination is innocent and in the public interest."422 'The second
416. Id. at 94.
417. Id. Both protective and deterrent considerations "are the two species of a broader
genus of considerations we might call guidance-promoting." Id.; see also FALLON, supra note
23, at 51 (noting that because the information available to the Court "is almost always less
than optimal ... the Court must assess the practical wisdom of rendering one or another
ruling" from "within a fog of uncertainty"); id. ("[T]he Court's job is to frame rules that will
clarify the law and guide future decisions, not only by lower courts, but also by nonjudicial
officials. The Court must therefore attempt to achieve a delicate balance along several
dimensions. It must consider the wisdom of alternative approaches in light of relative risks
that crucial, underlying assumptions may be mistaken to one or another degree." (footnote
omitted)). The uncertainty might be so great that, at the extremes, "it might be unwise to
articulate any applicable norm at all." Id.
418. Berman, supra note 11, at 95.
419. ROOSEVELT, supra note 406, at 30-32; see also FALLON, supra note 23, at 49-50 ("In
determining which rights to recognize, the Court must make calculations about judicial
capabilities and about the potential costs of authorizing judicial involvement. The shape of
constitutional doctrine reflects this concern."). Roosevelt offers the Court's willingness to
distinguish between positive and negative rights, enforcing the latter but not the former, as
one example. Id.
420. Berman, supra note 11, at 95.
421. ROOSEVELT, supra note 406, at 26-28.
422. Id. at 26.
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kind of situation in which an anti-deferential rule is justified,"
Roosevelt writes, "is one in which structural problems make it likely
that the legislature will fail to perform its cost-benefit balancing
function accurately. An example of this sort of problem is a case in
which the burdens of a law fall on out-of-staters. 423
3. Types of Decision Rules in Constitutional Law
So how can doctrine overprotect constitutional norms?
Underenforce them? What types of decision rules do we have to
choose from when considering the criteria described above?
In his groundbreaking book, Professor Fallon offers a guided tour
of decision rules commonly employed in constitutional law,
identifing seven different types of doctrinal tests:
(1) Forbidden-content tests are those in which "statutes, regula-
tions, or policies [are identified] as absolutely unconstitutional
based on their content. 424
(2) Suspect-content tests regard as suspect-but do not necessar-
ily absolutely forbid---certain legislation based on its content.425
423. Id. at 27. Professor Fallon mentions two other factors relevant to doctrine-creation:
"ultimate ideas of constitutional justice" and "democratic acceptability in light of reasonable
disagreement." FALLON, supra note 23, at 48, 51. The former, Fallon writes, means that when
designing doctrine, Justices should-where possible-adopt an interpretation that would
"make the Constitution the best that it can be" using "principles that-at some level-can
fairly be viewed as widely shared." Id. at 48.
Further, the Court should "attach significance to reasonable disagreement in determining
... which values the Constitution is best understood as encompassing at a particular time." Id.
at 51. According to Professor Fallon, "[t]he Court can reasonably view itself as having a
limited proxy to deliberate about constitutional issues on behalf of the people; if its judgment
sufficiently sways opinion, the requirement of democratic acceptability will be met." Id. at 52.
If not, then the Court might be seen as "intruding contestable values into a domain where it
is reasonable to think that no constitutional problem exists." Id.
Clashes among value judgments can be guided by three other considerations. First, the
degree to which a Justice is confident of the correctness of his or her decision should inform
the extent to which the decision "yield[s] to concerns of democratic unacceptability." Id. at 53.
Second "is the seriousness of the error or injustice that could result from yielding to concerns
of democratic unacceptability." Id. Finally, there is "the actual likelihood that a judicial ruling
would indeed prove democratically unacceptable, the number of people who would feel the
grievance, and the reasonableness and strenuousness of their objection." Id.
424. FALLON, supra note 23, at 78. His example is government-compelled worship. Id.
425. Id.
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(3) Balancing tests are those in which courts weigh competing
considerations to determine a statute's permissibility.4 26
(4) Non-suspect content tests, like the rational basis test,
"reflec[t] strong presumptions of constitutional validity.4 27
(5) Effects tests "focus not on the explicit content of a statute or
policy, but on its effects," like policies that "impose high costs on
those appealing criminal convictions."428
(6) Purpose tests invalidate 'legislation or other governmental
policies ... if developed or applied for constitutionally illegitimate
reasons."
429
(7) Appropriate deliberation tests "ask[ ] more generally whether
a challenged statue or policy results from fair or appropriate
deliberative processes. 43 °
Fallon is careful to note that the categories are far from hermeti-
cally sealed or mutually exclusive.43 '
Not all the tests are used with equal frequency, he points out:
[A]lthough some commentators have characterized the current
era of constitutional law as an "age of balancing," balancing tests
have relatively less influence within constitutional doctrine than
is often thought.... [Florbidden-content, effects, and appropriate
deliberation tests play relatively small roles in contemporary
doctrine.... [S]uspect- and non-suspect content tests dominate
large, important areas of constitutional law.... [C]ontemporary
constitutional doctrine reflects a larger concern with the
legitimacy of governmental purposes than is often appreciated.
Many doctrines prescribe invalidation of actions taken for
forbidden reasons; other tests function as surrogates for direct
inquiries into governmental purposes.4 2
The contemporary DCCD furnishes examples of doctrinal rules in
all their complex variety. Heightened scrutiny of state and local
laws deemed "discriminatory" have decision rules that embody
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 79.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 81 (footnotes omitted).
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suspect-content, effects, and purpose tests.433 Discriminatory laws
are upheld only if the government bears its burden of proving both
a non-protectionist end, and lack of less discriminatory means.434 An
argument can even be made that where facially discriminatory
measures are challenged, the Court sometimes comes close to
employing a forbidden content test.435 By contrast, review of
nondiscriminatory state regulations employs a deferential non-
suspect content form of balancing.436
C. New Decision Rules for the DCCD
The two-tiered standard of review reflects the confusion over the
operative proposition that underlies the DCCD. Because, as I
argued above, the best operative proposition is one that focuses on
state and local laws likely to undermine political union, a better set
of decision rules is required to enforce it. Some of the current
decision rules are inadequate to the task, and fare badly under the
criteria described above. Others could benefit from reexamination
using Berman, Fallon, and Roosevelt's criteria.
1. Goodbye to Balancing
A majority of the Court has not struck down a state or local law
using Pike balancing in over twenty-five years.4 37 Reconstruction of
the DCCD ought to begin with an explicit acknowledgement of what
the Court has already done sub silentio: repudiation of balancing as
a decision rule in DCCD cases. If the Constitution were primarily
designed to prevent frayed relations among states caused by
economic predation and retaliation, then truly nondiscriminatory
laws-an important caveat to which I will return below-should not
be subject to DCCD scrutiny at all. A law treating in-state and out-
of-state commerce alike poses little or no risk of triggering a round
of retaliatory lawmaking in other states. Whatever constitutional
433. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 n.15 (1981).
434. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
435. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978).
436. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
437. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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objections might be lodged against such a law, that it violates the
DCCD does not seem to be one.
Balancing forces courts, on limited information, to second-guess
legislative judgments as to things that are not readily reducible to
a common metric. If courts balance aggressively, they will overdeter
legislatures passing nondiscriminatory laws for the benefit of their
citizens, which undermines federalism. Balancing calls into question
courts' institutional competence (given their limited capacity for
fact-finding), raises institutional concerns by creating friction
between them and popularly elected legislatures, and increases
litigation costs to parties through the use of an unpredictable and
unstable standard. Balancing is likely to generate large numbers of
false positives if enforced aggressively. Moreover, to the extent the
constitutional norm at issue is concerned with a type of discrimina-
tory legislation, it hardly operationalizes that norm by focusing on
nondiscriminatory laws. If covert discrimination is the worry, one
is better off creating decision rules that address such discrimina-
tion, as opposed to balancing burdens and benefits.
2. Policing Discrimination
As noted above, the Supreme Court has relied on the
antidiscrimination principle as a decision rule to enforce the DCCD,
sometimes (but not always) tracing the rule to a constitutional
command prohibiting states from regulating commerce in ways
inimical to political union.4"8 In addition to this fudging of the
constitutional operative proposition the rule enforces, the Court has
also been imprecise in its definition of "discrimination." This
combination has sometimes resulted in aggressive implementation
of the antidiscrimination principle, threatening to convert the
DCCD into a form of economic substantive due process."' In recent
cases, the Court has trimmed the principle's sails, though in a
largely ad hoc manner. This section seeks to bring the antidis-
crimination principle in line with the operative proposition that it
should be enforcing.
438. See supra Part IV.A.1.
439. See supra Part III.B.2.
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a. 'Discrimination" and the DCCD: The Current Decision
Rule
Currently, the Court employs the following definition of "discrimi-
nation" in DCCD cases: "differential treatment of in-state and out-
of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the
latter. If a restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually
per se invalid. '440 Thus, the current decision rule is a non-deferen-
tial, suspect-content rule that places the evidentiary burden on the
government once a prima facie case of discrimination has been
made.
The current rule, however, is both under- and overinclusive. It is
underinclusive because it is not clear that a direct benefit to in-state
economic interests is required. For example, in City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey,44' the Court invalidated New Jersey's ban on the
importation of out-of-state wastes not necessarily because any in-
state economic interest benefited, but because the Court concluded
that New Jersey could not address its admittedly legitimate
environmental concerns by isolating itself, closing its borders to the
entry of undesirable products.442 In fact, at least in facial discrimina-
tion cases, plaintiffs are required to show neither benefits nor
burdens (other than the fact of the discrimination) in order to have
the Court apply the "virtually per se rule of invalidity. 443
Further, the definition is overinclusive, because the Court has
held that economic interests must be similarly situated, for
example, by being competitors. In General Motors Corp. v. Tracy
444
the Court wrote that
any notion of discrimination assumes a comparison of substan-
tially similar entities. Although this central assumption has
more often than not itself remained dormant in this Court's
opinions ... when the allegedly competing entities provide
different products, as here, there is a threshold question
440. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). For a recent use
of this definition, see Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005).
441. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
442. Id. at 626-27.
443. Id.
444. 519 U.S. 278 (1997).
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whether the companies are indeed similarly situated for
constitutional purposes.
445
The Court further explained:
This is so for the simple reason that the difference in products
may mean that the different entities serve different markets,
and would continue to do so even if the supposedly discrimina-
tory burden were removed. If in fact that should be the case,
eliminating the tax or other regulatory differential would not
serve the dormant Commerce Clause's fundamental objective of
preserving a national market for competition undisturbed by
preferential advantages conferred by a State upon its residents
or resident competitors.445
The definition might also be said to be overinclusive because of
the categorical exclusions from or exceptions to the DCCD that the
Court has created over the years. The oldest is the exception for
discriminatory laws that have congressional sanction. Congress may
use its affirmative commerce power to permit what the DCCD would
otherwise forbid.447 Another is the market-participant exception,
which permits states imitating private participants in particular
markets by, for example, buying goods and services with taxpayer
money or selling state-produced goods or services, to discriminate
between in-state and out-of-state economic actors.448
In 2007, the Court excluded another category from its antidis-
crimination decision rule by exempting laws "benefit[ing] a clearly
public facility" over "particular private businesses," at least where
"all private companies [i.e., in-state and out-of-state] [are treated]
445. Id. at 298-99 (footnote omitted).
446. Id. at 299; see also Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Ass'n of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 668-
70 (2003) (rejecting discriminatory effects claim against state law requiring drug companies
to rebate portion of purchase price of drugs to state, which used rebates to subsidize purchase
and sale of discounted drugs, and noting that "the Maine Rx Program will not impose a
disparate burden on any competitors"); Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978)
(rejecting discriminatory effects claim against state law prohibiting petroleum refiners from
owning retail service stations on ground that nothing prevented out-of-state independently-
owned service stations from competing with those owned by in-state residents).
447. See generally COENEN, supra note 10, at 292-96.
448. See generally id. at 302-14.
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exactly the same. 44s Just two terms ago, the Court extended this
exception in a case involving state tax exemptions for income
derived from in-state, but not out-of-state, bonds.45 °
On one level, these undertheorized exclusions and exemptions
reflect the vices of major and minor calcification discussed above,45
which I will not rehash here. But if the Court is rethinking the
DCCD in general, and the antidiscrimination principle in particular,
following a decision rules model of adjudication could inject clarity
and coherence long absent from the doctrine.
b. The Easy Case of Facial Discrimination
Like nearly all operative propositions, the proposition posited
above-that the Constitution and the Commerce Clause limit state
commercial regulation likely to undermine political union---can
dictate the outcome of few cases as stated. The question then
becomes what form decision rules implementing this norm should
take?
A decision rule rooted in the avoidance of disunion should be just
overinclusive enough to both take account of the frequency of
unconstitutional action (DCCD cases represent a sizeable portion of
constitutional challenges to state and local laws) and of legislative
pathologies (the desire to favor one's residents at the expense of
outsiders), as well as clear enough to provide guidance for
policymakers who try to avoid running afoul of the DCCD and the
antidiscrimination principle. It should, at a minimum, invalidate
"classic protectionist devices that shield[] local enterprise from
external competition: tariffs, embargoes, and quotas, as well as
other laws that "invit[e] retaliatory regulation of other products, and
... create an incentive for protected local competition to arise or for
outside producers to move operations into the state. 453
At the same time, both the possibility of a state or local govern-
ment's avoiding invalidation by satisfying the requirements of strict
449. United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct.
at 1786, 1795 (2007).
450. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
451. See supra Part III.B.
452. Collins, supra note 10, at 75.
453. Id. at 76.
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scrutiny, and of congressional action to permit what, as a default
rule, the antidiscrimination principle prohibits, should satisfy
Berman's concern with ensuring that the judiciary will enforce the
antidiscrimination principle without permitting the fear of a false
positive to deter them. Congress provides the ultimate backstop
through its ability to sanction laws invalidated by courts if it feels
courts have gone too far in applying the rule.
By these measures, the current antidiscrimination rule performs
tolerably well when applied to those laws that are facially
discriminatory-that is, laws that explicitly refer to the geographic
origin of goods or services and single out for unfavorable treatment
those from out of state. History illustrates that certain taxes and
other trade regulations-tariffs, embargoes, imposts, and the
like-that sought to secure benefits for citizens of the enacting
state, while imposing costs on out-of-state residents, posed a serious
threat to the stability of the Confederation in the mid-1780s.454 The
term "discrimination" is a useful shorthand to describe this kind of
unequal treatment based on the geographic origin of the regulated
economic actor.
As a decision rule, the antidiscrimination principle is a prophylac-
tic rule, potentially overenforcing the operative proposition barring
commercial regulations that risk igniting trade wars and disrupt-
ing political union. The Court has tried to compensate for this by, as
noted above, both applying a suspect- (as opposed to a forbidden-)
content test, and by creating categorical exclusions from the
DCCD.455
Nevertheless, the antidiscrimination principle fares pretty well
by Berman, Fallon, and Roosevelt's criteria for decision rules. The
Court would seem to be on solid ground choosing a non-deferential
decision rule. "Discrimination" was a special concern of the Framers
-a concern reflected in the text of the Constitution itself;456 rules
focusing on implementing that special concern would seem best
suited to serving Berman's substantive considerations.457 Or as
Professor Fallon would describe it, decision rules focusing on
454. See supra notes 383-401 and accompanying text; see also Denning, supra note 383.
455. See supra notes 433-36, 447-50 and accompanying text.
456. See supra notes 393-98 and accompanying text.
457. See supra note 420 and accompanying text.
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commercial discrimination best implement the constitutional
command itself.
458
As Professor Roosevelt eloquently put it, "decision rules will have
special favorites, as long as, and to the extent that, state actors have
special victims."459 And the history of state action throughout the life
of the DCCD demonstrates that state legislatures often succumb
to the temptation to provide benefits to their citizens at the expense
of someone else, preferably some out-of-state actor.46' Because of
this propensity to externalize costs, the normal political processes
that are counted on to police legislatures are often unavailable to
those affected by the regulations-this is Roosevelt's "democracy
deficit. 46'
The current antidiscrimination rule also has the apparent benefit
of clarity and predictability, which allows for ease of application by
courts and clear guidance for policymakers choosing laws. It would
thus seem to do well minimizing error costs and enforcement costs,
while not taxing courts' institutional competence.
Relatedly, giving courts a clear idea of what they are supposed to
be enforcing also minimizes fiscal concerns and enforcement costs.
Here, too, the antidiscrimination principle performs relatively well
-especially with regard to those laws explicitly drawing geograph-
ical distinctions between economic competitors.
c. Hard Cases: Discriminatory Effects and Discriminatory
Purpose
It is tempting to restrict the antidiscrimination decision rule to
facially discriminatory laws, as some DCCD critics have urged.
462
458. See FALLON, supra note 23, at 5.
459. Roosevelt, supra note 14, at 1703.
460. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427-28 (1819).
461. See ELY, supra note 368, at 77-87. My reliance on a democracy deficit to justify a
decision rule does not contradict my earlier critique of the "representation-reinforcing" theory
of the DCCD. See supra Part IV.A.1.b. When deciding how best to implement the operative
proposition--especially when considering whether a court should craft a deferential or non-
deferential rule vis-A-vis legislatures-it seems entirely appropriate to consider whether
conditions exist that make one skeptical about the legislators' ability and incentive to self-
police.
462. Notably Justice Scalia. See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue,
483 U.S. 232, 262, 264 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing
the DCCD and urging its abandonment).
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But if we do, the constitutional operative proposition will go
underenforced. Laws can easily be written to eliminate any explicit
mention of geographical origin, thus concealing the true target of
the regulation and, perhaps, the true intention of legislators.
Current DCCD decision rules deal with this by also applying strict
scrutiny to those laws that, though facially neutral, discriminate in
either purpose or effect.
The problem, discussed elsewhere,463 is that because the Court
has never been transparent about how one ascertains discrimina-
tory purpose or which effects warrant application of strict or
heightened scrutiny, it is difficult to predict when the Court will
apply the latter, as opposed to the deferential Pike balancing. This
means that the "rule" begins to look like a standard, with all the
attendant loss of predictability, stability, and transparency.
But here again, I would argue, adopting a decision rules model
could aid constitutional decisionmaking. Policing effects and
purpose are necessary to ensure the operative proposition is
optimally enforced--or at least not grossly underenforced because
of the ease of evasion on the part of state and local governments.
Therefore it makes sense to apply the same suspect-content test to
facially neutral statutes with discriminatory effects or discrimina-
tory purposes, because the latter could undermine the operative
proposition as effectively as an overtly discriminatory law.
The problem is that an initial determination must be made about
standards of proof for both effects and purpose. Additional decision
rules (which I will call subrules, for clarity's sake) are needed to
explicate the decision rules implementing the operative proposition.
What we want to avoid is the elevation of form over substance:
permitting a clever state or local legislative body simply to omit
explicit geographic distinctions from a law, which otherwise
operates to disadvantage only out-of-state goods or economic actors
as effectively as if it were facially discriminatory. But what sorts of
effects, and what amount, should suffice to shift the burden back to
the state? In general, as I have argued before, the concern is
scrutinizing laws "whose effects insulate one locality's economic
actors from competition by out-of-state economic actors ''44' because
463. See Denning & Lary, supra note 261, at 916-37.
464. Id. at 933.
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the tendency would be for all states to do the same, igniting a low-
level trade war among the states. The Court's own cases have found
the following effects to be discriminatory:
" Effectively barring the import or sale of an imported good;465
* Raising costs of doing business in a state for out-of-state
competitors of in-state producers, which costs are not also
borne by the in-state interests; 466
" Stripping competitive advantages from out-of-state competi-
tors, thus leveling the playing field to the advantage of in-state
producers;467
" Creating a tax and subsidy scheme that operates in such a way
that only the out-of-state actor is taxed.468
This is a non-exclusive list;469 the Court would not be restricted to
these, but it seems that such effects would most closely resemble
facially discriminatory statutes likely to trigger retaliation by other
states, perhaps through imitation. Moreover, it is important to
remember that all a finding of discriminatory effects does is shift
the burden back to the state to demonstrate both an innocent aim
and the lack of less discriminatory means.
States may even assist courts in flagging other states' overreach-
ing by filing amicus briefs urging invalidation. Chris Drahozal has
found that the Court is more likely to sustain DCCD challenges to
465. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522, 527 (1935) (striking down law
barring the sale of milk purchased for less than minimum price set by state, as applied to milk
purchased in another state).
466. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-51 (1977) (invalidating
regulation barring use of state grades on apples where Washington had developed state-of-
the-art grading system, and North Carolina had no separate grading system, stating that
"[tihe first, and most obvious [effect] is the statute's consequence of raising the costs of doing
business in the North Carolina market for Washington apple growers and dealers, while
leaving those of their North Carolina counterparts unaffected").
467. Id. at 351.
468. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994) (concluding that tax-
subsidy scheme was similar to a "protective tariff or customs duty, which taxes goods
imported from other States, but does not tax similar products produced in State").
469. For example, Dan Farber and Robert Hudec have suggested that another
discriminatory effect might occur when a statute "regulate[s] on the basis of some
characteristic that, while purportedly neutral, has little independent significance and is in
reality a proxy for geographic differences-that is, the characteristic is shared by virtually all
in-state firms and virtually no out-of-state firms." Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free
Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47
VAND. L. REv. 1401, 1416 (1994).
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state laws where other states urge it to do so.470 His hypothesis is
that states act as "fire alarms," aiding the Court in monitoring
compliance with the DCCD.471 The willingness of states to file briefs
with the Court urging invalidation (or not) could be strongly
suggestive of which laws states view as most threatening to their
own interests (and the interests of their citizens).
Constitutional law relies on effects tests in part to smoke out
illegitimate or unconstitutional purposes that may have contributed
to the passage of the law. In many areas of constitutional law (like
race and sex discrimination), discriminatory effects or disparate
impact are not sufficient to prove discrimination; you must also
prove discriminatory intent.472
Invalidating laws on the basis of allegedly unconstitutional
motives of legislators has a checkered history in constitutional
law.473 The Court itself has occasionally stated that motive is
irrelevant; judicial and academic critics have argued that it is
incoherent to speak of the "motive" of a multimember legislative
body.474 And yet, purpose inquiries continue to be common in
constitutional doctrine.475
Under the DCCD, proof of either purpose or effects is sufficient.
476
As with effects, however, the Court has not given any clear indica-
tion of how one might go about proving discriminatory purpose, or
even why purpose should be considered.477
470. Christopher R. Drahozal, Preserving the American Common Market: State and Local
Governments in the United States Supreme Court, 7 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 233, 235 (1997).
471. Id.
472. See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 277 (1979); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
473. See, e.g., Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration, supra note 19 (tracing the
controversy over purpose inquires).
474. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Bablu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 558
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that it "is virtually impossible to determine the
singular 'motive' of a collective legislative body, ... and this Court has a long tradition of
refraining from such inquiries") (citations omitted).
475. See, e.g., Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration, supra note 19; see also Calvin
Massey, The Role of Governmental Purpose in Constitutional Judicial Review, 59 S.C. L. REV.
1 (2007).
476. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 471 n.15 (1981).
477. As for the defense of a purpose-based inquiry, I have always found Donald Regan's
defense of purpose inquires in the DCCD persuasive. Regan notes that because of the
possibility of evading explicit prohibitions against protectionism by cloaking laws in neutral
terms, those explicit prohibitions will inevitably underenforce the relevant constitutional
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Regan argues that "a motive can 'contribute substantially' to the
adoption of a law ... without being the dominant motive," but
confessed that the question of "how much contribution is substan-
tial" was one "where precision is impossible." '478 He does offer that
the burden of proof on "substantial contribution" should be based on
a preponderance of the evidence.479
The Eighth and Fourth Circuits have gone further, offering
subrules for what sorts of evidence would be admissible to establish
the presence of discriminatory purpose.4" Both borrow from Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,481
which articulated factors to be used in ascertaining whether
discriminatory intent was present in claims of racial discrimina-
tion.482 Taken together,48 3 the circuit court cases generally permit
introduction of:
" The historical background of the decision to enact a law;
" The sequence of events leading up to the law's enactment,
especially where the sequence suggests irregular timing or the
use of irregular procedures;
" The legislative or administrative history of the law, including
statements of purpose appearing on the law itself, or state-
ments offered in support of the law; and
norm. Regan, supra note 10, at 1144-45. Further, a purpose-based inquiry inhibits no
legitimate state action, but merely that action undertaken for an illegitimate end (what Regan
terms "protectionism"). Id. at 1145. "Let the state avoid this improper goal, and it can do what
it wants." Id. Further, he argues that "[tihe business of the courts (when they are engaged in
judicial review) is to see that legislatures do their duty," id. at 1146-47, including,
presumably, avoiding legislating to constitutionally proscribed ends. If a "protectionist
purpose contributed substantially to the adoption of the law," Regan argues, then courts
should strike it down. Id. at 1151. Smoking out illegitimate motives "is just the kind of
problem courts are best at. Courts must ascertain the purpose with which some agent ... acted
in many areas of law." Id. at 1152. He calls such inquiries "the judge's daily fare." Id.
478. Id. at 1149. He does offer this: "If only one legislator out of many is motivated by
protectionist purpose, then protectionist purpose does not contribute substantially even
though that legislator's vote is crucial." Id.
479. Id. at 1151.
480. See S.D. Farm Bureau v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 593-95 (8th Cir. 2004); Smithfield
Foods, Inc. v. Miller, 367 F.3d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir. 2003); Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v.
Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 336 (4th Cir. 2001).
481. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
482. See id. at 267-68; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
483. For block quotations from the cases, see Denning & Lary, supra note 261, at 923.
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* Gaps that exist between means and ends; for example, the
inclusion of exemptions that benefit existing in-state commer-
cial interests.484
Again, the list of possible sources of discriminatory purpose is not
meant to be exhaustive; and even if there were sufficient evidence
to conclude that a prima facie case for discriminatory purpose had
been met, the rules would still permit the state to prove a valid
interest and lack of less discriminatory means.
d. Limiting the Decision Rule
I have argued here that "discrimination" is a tolerably good proxy
for the potentially-trade-war-provoking state commercial regula-
tions the Commerce Clause was intended to limit. Not only should
the Court invoke the rule against laws that are facially discrimina-
tory, but it should also create rules to enforce the principle against
facially neutral laws with discriminatory effects, laws motivated by
a discriminatory purpose, or both.
To tie the decision rule more closely to the operative proposition,
I propose that states have an opportunity to prove that the regula-
tion is not the sort that would produce the kind of tit-for-tat
response corrosive of political union. Although the Court offers the
opportunity to prove a legitimate interest and the lack of less
discriminatory alternatives as part of the current decision rule, my
additional "out" for state or local laws, like the Court's own categori-
cal exclusions,"' would mean that a court would never get to that
point. If the state carries its burden, the inquiry-at least under the
DCCD-ends.
Although this sounds novel, it actually approximates what the
Court seems to be doing in practice already, though for better
reasons. Moreover, such categorical exclusions are not unknown in
constitutional law. To give but one example, the Court has long
excluded certain categories of speech from constitutional protection,
in large part because of the judicial determination that the values
underlying the First Amendment are not served by strictly scruti-
nizing laws regulating speech in those categories (including obscene
484. Id.
485. See supra notes 432-38 and accompanying text.
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speech and "fighting words").4"' In Part V, I will show how this limit
can explain the outcome of recent DCCD decisions better than the
Court itself does.
V. APPLYING THE NEW DECISION RULES MODEL: FOUR HARD CASES
One might reasonably ask what difference, if any, my new
decision rules model would make in the DCCD. In this Part, I
attempt an answer, testing both the constitutional operative
proposition and the decision rules I proposed in Part IV against four
cases that pose difficulties in the DCCD. My modest claim is that
my reconstruction of the DCCD justifies some decisions better than
the Court itself has done and, in one or two cases, suggests that the
Court was in error, and why. Although the case studies here cannot
lay claim to being a comprehensive survey, I do feel confident in
saying that they represent some of the more troubling aspects of the
DCCD. If my decision rules model of the DCCD can shed light in the
hard cases, it does not seem unreasonable to conclude it would be
helpful in the range of easier cases as well.
A. Dean Milk v. Madison and the Problem of "Local"
Discrimination
In Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,487 the Court applied a form of strict
scrutiny to a Madison, Wisconsin ordinance prohibiting the sale of
milk in Madison unless it had been pasteurized within a five-mile
486. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 13 (2d ed. 2003) ("Historically,
some kinds of speech were considered to be simply outside the scope of the First
Amendment."). While this is an oversimplification today, "[tihese categories of speech continue
to receive special treatment." Id.
The Court may have signaled its intention to do something similar with the Second
Amendment's right to keep and bear arms. In the recent Heller decision, the majority
suggested, in dicta, that some gun control regulations were "presumptively lawful." See
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-17 & n.26 (2008).
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms.
Id.
487. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
20081 505
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
radius of the city center.4s In his opinion, Justice Clark concluded
that Madison had "erect[ed] an economic barrier protecting a major
local industry against competition from without the State" and
that the ordinance "plainly discriminate[d] against interstate
commerce."489 In a footnote, the Court declared it "immaterial that
Wisconsin milk from outside the Madison area is subjected to the
same proscription as that moving in interstate commerce," citing the
1891 case of Brimmer v. Rebman.49°
Brimmer involved a Virginia statute prohibiting the sale of meat
that was slaughtered more than one-hundred miles from the point
of sale, unless it had been inspected and the inspector paid a penny
per pound as a fee.49' In his opinion for the Court, Justice Harlan
regarded the "inspection fee" as a tax that discriminated against
interstate commerce and thus violated the DCCD.49' He continued:
Nor can this statute be brought into harmony with the Constitu-
tion by the circumstance that it purports to apply alike to the
citizens of all the States, including Virginia; for "a burden
imposed by a State upon interstate commerce is not to be
sustained simply because the statute imposing it applies alike
to the people of all the States, including the people of the State
enacting such statute. 493
The quoted language was itself taken from another inspection
case, Minnesota v. Barber,494 in which Justice Harlan struck down
a state law prohibiting the sale of meat within any municipality
unless it had been slaughtered within twenty-four hours after its
inspection.49 5 Justice Harlan justified the language quoted above,
stating that "[t]he people of Minnesota have as much right to
protection against the enactments of that State, interfering with the
488. Id. at 350.
489. Id. at 354. The plaintiff was an Illinois corporation that sold milk in both Illinois and
Wisconsin. Id. at 349.
490. Id. at 354 n.4 (citing Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891)).
491. Brimmer, 138 U.S. at 80-81.
492. Id. at 82 ("Any local regulation which, in terms or by its necessary operation, denies
... equality in the markets of a State is, when applied to the people and products or industries
of other States, a direct burden on commerce among the States, and, therefore, void.").
493. Id. at 82-83 (quoting Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890)).
494. Barber, 136 U.S. 313.
495. Id. at 318-19.
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freedom of commerce among the States, as have the people of other
States.""49 Despite the evenhandedness of the Minnesota statute,
Harlan concluded that "its necessary effect [was] to burden or
obstruct commerce with other States. 497
As recently as 1992, the Court reaffirmed Dean Milk and the
older cases. In Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan
Department of Natural Resources,498 the Court invalidated portions
of a state law prohibiting county landfills from accepting out-of-
county solid waste, citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.499 The
Court rejected the claim that the statute was evenhanded, because
it applied to all out-of-county waste, regardless of its inter- or
intrastate origins. Citing Dean Milk and Brimmer,500 Justice
Stevens replied that "our prior cases teach that a State (or one of its
political subdivisions) may not avoid the strictures of the Commerce
Clause by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce through
subdivisions of the State, rather than through the State itself."5 °1
It is not obvious under contemporary theories of the DCCD that
laws favoring local (as opposed to state) economic actors are
"discriminatory" and should trigger strict scrutiny. If the point is to
prevent states from favoring in-state interests over those from out-
of-state, then what justifies strictly scrutinizing laws that treat in-
state and out-of-state commerce alike, visiting identical disabilities
on both in pursuit of some local goal, like health or sanitation?
These decisions are particularly troublesome if one views the
antidiscrimination principle as a necessary preventative to imposing
costs on nonvoting outsiders. In these cases, affected in-state
residents could serve as virtual representatives for those from out-
of-state. Thus, the standard of review should be balancing, at best.
But if the DCCD is really about preventing political disintegra-
tion, or at least preventing centrifugal cycles of discrimination and
retaliation, then the rules about local discrimination make sense. If
state laws targeting out-of-state commerce for disfavored treatment
are prohibited because of the fear of "Balkanization," then it makes
496. Id. at 326.
497. Id.
498. 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
499. Id. at 355 (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)).
500. Id. at 361-63.
501. Id. at 361.
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little sense to permit a state or local government to cover just
enough in-state activity to have its laws regarded as "evenhanded"
and escape heightened scrutiny.
The consequences would seem clear otherwise: local governments
countrywide could protect their own economic actors by passing
similar laws; suddenly the problem of Balkanization is not confined
to fifty states, but to thousands of county and municipal govern-
ments. The danger to political integration is unmistakable, and is
inconsistent with the Framers' purposes in centralizing control over
commerce as permitting state-level discrimination.
B. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc. and Economic Development
Incentives
No recent case illustrates the difficulties inherent in the Court's
treatment of "discriminatory" state laws better than Cuno v.
DaimlerChrysler, Inc.,5°2 in which the Sixth Circuit struck down an
Ohio tax credit that reduced taxes for manufacturers-whether they
were headquartered in the state or not-making certain in-state
investments. °3 The appeals court found that the tax credit, which
would have reduced preexisting tax liabilities, impermissibly
"coerced" DaimlerChrysler to invest in Ohio as opposed to else-
where. °4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but then dismissed
on the ground that the state taxpayers lacked standing.0 5 The issue
persists, however, and if plaintiffs can ever survive standing
challenges, the issue might again end up in the Supreme Court.0 6
502. 386 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006).
503. Id. Cuno generated a great deal of literature at the time. For a sampling, see, e.g.,
Symposium, DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno and the Constitutionality of State Tax Incentives for
Economic Development, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 15,164 (2006); Zelinsky & Denning, supra
note 254. The Court's theory of coercion was borrowed from Walter Hellerstein and Dan
Coenen. See Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State
Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789 (1996).
504. Cuno, 386 F.3d at 745-46.
505. DaimlerChrysler, Inc. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1862-64 (2006). On the Court's
opinion, see Brannon P. Denning, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, State Investment Incentives,
and the Future of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 2005-2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 173,
174-79.
506. See Morgan L. Holcomb & Nicholas Allen Smith, The Post-Cuno Litigation Landscape,
58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (discussing the contemporary state of tax
incentive litigation).
508 [Vol. 50:417
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Cuno highlights a particular
difficulty in an alleged facial discrimination case. In the paradig-
matic facial discrimination case, State A passes a law that draws a
distinction between domestic goods or services and those coming
from out-of-state. State A's goods or services are treated better, in
some way, than those from, say, State B. In Cuno, however, the
investment tax credit was made available to any entity, regardless
of geographical origin, making the requisite capital investment in
the state. It was this geographic differentiation that the lower court
seized on, holding that the requirement rendered the tax credit
"coercive."5 °7
But what makes the right answer so difficult to perceive is that,
unlike in some other cases,"' this was not an attempt to favor in-
state firms over their out-of-state competitors doing business in the
state. Nor would DaimlerChrysler's taxes go up if they did not make
the investment-it faced no penalty for not locating additional
facilities in Ohio.5"9 It is thus difficult to locate the out-of-state
interest burdened by the decision to extend a tax credit to in-state
capital investment.
Although there was case law supporting the outcome in Cuno,
much of it tended to adopt decision rules built on the assumption
that the elimination of economic inefficiencies in regulation was at
the heart of the Commerce Clause's restrictions on states.5 10 Counsel
for the plaintiffs, Peter Enrich, went farther, arguing that any state
laws that "distort" economic decisionmaking violate the DCCD.511
On the other hand, others, like Edward Zelinsky, argued that Cuno
was the reductio ad absurdum of the antidiscrimination principle
because it treated economically identical events (tax incentives vs.
subsidies) differently, permitting the latter but not the former, and
compromised the free trade principle at the heart of the DCCD.1 2
Professor Zelinsky argued that (in tax cases at least) the whole
concept should be scrapped. 13
507. Cuno, 386 F.3d at 745-46.
508. See, e.g., Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
509. See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
510. See supra notes 358-67 and accompanying text.
511. See Enrich, supra note 316.
512. See Zelinsky & Denning, supra note 254.
513. See id.
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If one accepts my reformulation of the constitutional operative
proposition for the DCCD as well as some version of the decision
rule I propose, the difficulty posed by the Ohio tax credit at issue in
Cuno (and perhaps the differential treatment by the Court of
discriminatory subsidies) dissolves. It is difficult to see how one
state's subsidy of a particular activity, whether it is through cash or
some tax credit, if offered to in-state and out-of-state firms equally,
would begin the cycle of discrimination and retaliation that would
threaten interstate harmony. At most, it would seem to set states in
competition with one another to attract the particular activity they
sought to stimulate.514 Only by arguing either (a) that this sort of
competition is as inherently harmful as that the Framers sought to
prevent, or (b) that the DCCD was intended to safeguard free trade
simpliciter, could the argument for invalidating subsidies or even
Cuno-like tax credits gain any traction.
Given that subsidies were known (and approved of, or at least not
complained about) during the Framing Era, 15 proposition (a) would
seem to be a hard argument to make successfully. As for proposition
(b), my (and others') argument here and elsewhere tends to show
otherwise. Subsidies may be bad policy, make little economic sense,
and contribute nothing to economic growth in a state,1 6 but that
does not make them unconstitutional. Striking them down would
constitutionalize economic efficiency and authorize courts to strike
down economically inefficient state laws that impact out-of-state
economic actors. Huge numbers of state and local laws would
become vulnerable as a result. In such a case, comparisons to
Lochner-era substantive due process would be irresistible.
C. United Haulers, Davis, and the Public-Private Distinction
Another "hard case" concerns the justification for the recently
created exemption from DCCD scrutiny of certain publicly owned
514. Though this might require explanation and defense that would lengthen an already
lengthy article, I think that these facts might also go far to justify the market-participant
exception. At most, it seems, one state's decision to buy in-state goods or trade only with in-
state residents when spending its citizens' money or selling goods the state produced itself
would likely only stimulate other states to do the same. This, in turn, could actually produce
broadly distributed benefits as state and local governments compete for citizens.
515. See Coenen, Business Subsidies, supra note 10, at 970.
516. See, e.g., Enrich, supra note 316, at 442-43.
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facilities apparently announced in United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority517 in 2007 and
extended in Department of Revenue v. Davis. The Court justified its
holding that forcing all waste haulers in a given area to use a
publicly owned facility, thereby prohibiting the export of garbage for
out-of-area processing, was constitutional51 on several grounds: (1)
that public entities often exercise police powers on behalf of their
citizens; 19 (2) therefore laws favoring public entities are not
necessarily motivated by "simple economic protectionism" ;5 2' and (3)
the DCCD should not be interpreted to constitutionalize free trade
values;52' (4) particularly when the government was engaged in a
"traditional governmental function" like trash collection.5 22 For good
measure, it suggested (5) that because the burden fell on those who
would have to pay higher prices, haulers wishing to export waste for
processing elsewhere were virtually represented in the political
process.
523
The problem with the Court's rationales is that many of them
have been deemed irrelevant in past cases, would prove too much if
adopted, are beyond the Court's institutional competence, or some
combination of all three. Take (1) for example: just about any
commercial regulation could also be characterized as an exercise of
the police power-that much has been clear since the Marshall
Court era.524 Recognizing this, the Court has turned aside argu-
ments against DCCD scrutiny based on the "convenient apologetics
of the police power.'5 25 Further, contrary to the suggestion of (2), the
Court's current standard of review condemns not only illicit means
517. 127 S. Ct. 1786 (2007).
518. Id. at 1795.
519. Id.
520. Id. at 1795-96.
521. Id. at 1796.
522. Id.
523. Id. at 1787.
524. See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
525. See Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373,380 (1946); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,
780 (1945); cf. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 287-88 (1978) ("It is a basic principle
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that '[n]either the power to tax nor the police power may
be used by the state of destination with the aim and effect of establishing an economic barrier
against competition with the products of another state or the labor of the residents." (quoting
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935))).
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(like economic protectionism), but ends as well, like prohibiting the
import or export of a good or service. 28
Finally, although I could hardly argue with (3), given my account
of the constitutional operative proposition, I find it strange that the
Court would suggest in (4) a wish to resurrect the "traditional
governmental function" test it abandoned as unworkable in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.52 ' And I would bet
that the Court does not really intend to commit itself to that
doctrine's exhumation either.
What I do think that the Court was doing, though, was struggling
for a limiting principle for the concept of "discrimination" that it
could not quite articulate. Were the Court to commit to a vision of
the DCCD rooted in the political union theory described in Part IV,
it could have written a more convincing opinion. Favoring local
waste-processing where in-state and out-of-state haulers alike were
required to use the local processing facility was permissible not
because export-minded haulers were virtually represented by other
interests,528 but because the Court intuited that the forced-use
requirement posed no (or little) threat to the DCCD's core values. It
is hard to see how the Oneida-Herkimer ordinance could spark
retaliation by similarly situated counties or states in the same way
that, say, forcing only out-of-state haulers to use the local public
facility would.
The problem with the reasons the Court gave is that they might
support extension of the exemption where it is not appropriate as
the Court did in Department of Revenue v. Davis,529 in which the
Court upheld an income tax exemption for in-state, but not out-of-
state public bonds. The Court extended United Haulers to Davis and
upheld the tax exemptions, in part on the theory that raising money
through the use of municipal bonds is a "traditional governmental
526. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978) (stating that "the evil
of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends" and invalidating
prohibition on importation of out-of-state garbage for in-state disposal).
527. 469 U.S. 528, 543-46 (1985) (rejecting as unworkable the concept of "traditional
governmental functions" as a limit on congressional authority under the Commerce Clause
to regulate states as states).
528. See supra Part IV.A.I.b (describing the flaws with the representation-reinforcing
theory of the DCCD).
529. 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
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function" and a valid exercise of the state's police power, because the
exemption enabled the state to do this more cheaply.131
Although that may be true, it does not necessarily warrant the
extension of United Haulers to Davis. As Justice Kennedy observed
in his Davis dissent, "[t]hat 41 States have local protectionist laws
similar to this one proves the necessity of allowing settled princi-
ples against discrimination to operate in an important national
market." '' Following New York's enactment, other states followed
suit, proving, for Justice Kennedy, that "[iun the wake of one trade
barrier, retaliatory measures follow, as the Framers well knew. The
widespread nature of these particular trade barriers illustrates the
standard dynamics of politics and economics, demonstrating once
more the need to avoid validating this law as somehow in the States'
own interests. 532
Davis was a hard case that the Court decided as if it were an easy
one.533 Requiring the State to demonstrate that there is no trade war
going on or that the exemption is markedly different from a tariff,
as opposed to permitting it to invoke the "convenient apologetics of
the police power" or a newly created and undertheorized precedent
like United Haulers might prevent the latter's "exemption" from
eventually swallowing the rule.
530. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810-11.
531. Id. at 1829 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
532. Id.; see also Brief for Respondents at 26-27, Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, No. 06-666
(U.S. Sept. 21,2007) ("Kentucky's scheme, combined with the similar laws of other States, has
precisely the effect of fostering an ongoing, low-level trade war, and is a textbook example of
a law the Commerce Clause was intended to prevent.'); 1 JEROME HELLERSTEIN & WALTER
HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 4.13[2][e] (3d ed., 1998) ('I]f ever one needed proof that such
discriminatory state taxes Balkanize our national capital markets, one need look no further
than the state-specific municipal bond funds that have arisen directly as a result of these
discriminatory state taxes.").
533. For an argument that Davis was an easy case-for affirming the lower court, see
Ethan Yale & Brian Galle, Municipal Bonds and the Dormant Commerce Clause After United
Haulers, 115 TAX NOTES 1037,1038-39 (2007). Norman Williams and I have written a detailed
critique of Davis and the new "public entities" exception to the DCCD. See Norman R.
Williams & Brannon P. Denning, The New Protectionism and the Dormant Commerce Clause
(unpublished work-in-progress).
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D. Exxon v. Maryland and the Problem of Discriminatory Effects
I have left the hardest question for last: would adopting the new
decision rules that I propose help the Court decide discriminatory
effects cases, like Exxon v. Maryland?534 Stated another way, was
forcing oil producers and refiners to divest their retail service
stations a kind of commercial regulation that could conceivably
create friction among states? Was the law akin to a tariff, embargo,
or impost that would produce resentment and, possibly, retaliation
in other states?
Certainly if State A explicitly barred corporations located in State
B from operating their businesses in State A, one would expect the
DCCD to prohibit such a law. On a superficial level Exxon is easily
distinguished: Maryland's law did not explicitly bar out-of-state
refiners and producers from owning retail service stations, while
permitting in-state refiners and producers to do so. Assuming, as I
have, that DCCD decision rules ought to guard against under-
enforcement of the relevant constitutional norm by closing avenues
of easy evasion, the question then becomes whether- despite being
facially neutral-the law's practical effects rendered it similar
enough to a facially discriminatory law to warrant the application
of strict scrutiny.
Here, in part, is where my decision rules model is an improve-
ment over the current rule. The latter will invalidate if discrimina-
tory effects are proven, and the Court has done so in the past. But
the Court has never specifically indicated what effects are discrimi-
natory. Looking at a few of the subrules I propose above, 5 5 1 think
that Maryland should have been required to put forth a legitimate
interest and demonstrate that divestiture of petroleum producers
and refiners was the only way to achieve its interest.
First, "producer and refiner owned retail service stations" was a
near-perfect proxy for "out-of-state economic interests." According
to Justice Blackmun's dissent, "[o]f the class of enterprises excluded
entirely from participation in the retail gasoline market, 95% were
out-of-state firms, operating 98% of the stations in the class." '536 By
534. 437 U.S. 117 (1978); see supra Part III.B.2.b.i for a description of Exxon.
535. See supra Part IV.C.2.
536. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 138 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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contrast, "[o]f the class of stations statutorily insulated from the
competition of the out-of-state integrated firms ... more than 99%
were operated by local business interests." '537
Second, the law did not simply "raise costs" to out-of-state
interests not borne by those in-state, as in the Hunt case,5 38 it
barred out-of-state interests from competing in that market alto-
gether. "In Hunt," Justice Blackmun noted, "the statute merely
increased costs and deprived Washington growers of the competitive
advantages of the use of their grading system. 539 Maryland, by
contrast, "ban[ned] the refiners and producers from the retail
market altogether .... 540
Third, the ban on producer/refiner-owned retail stations stripped
competitive advantages from the producers and refiners who
competed in the retail gasoline market on price, as opposed to
competing on brand recognition.541 "Only with ... control [of price,
hours, and other business details] can sufficient sales volume be
achieved to produce satisfactory profits at prices two to three cents
a gallon below those of the major branded stations."'542 The law also
leveled the playing field in favor of the locally owned retail stations,
insulating them from competition.54
3
Taken together, the law functions as close to a facially discrimina-
tory law as possible without mentioning geography specifically. As
Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent, Exxon authorized states to
"insulate in-state interests from competition by identifying the most
potent segments of out-of-state business, banning them, and
permiting less effective out-of-state actors to remain." '544 To the
extent that the powerful out-of-state interests-like oil produc-
ers-are closely identified with particular states, we might expect
537. Id.
538. See supra notes 264-67 and accompanying text.
539. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 148 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
540. Id.
541. Id. at 138 ("According to repeated testimony ... nonbranded stations can compete
successfully only if they have day-to-day control of the retail price of their products, the hours
of operations of their stations, and related business details.").
542. Id. at 138-39.
543. Id. at 140 ("Indeed, rather than restricting their ability to compete, the Maryland Act
effectively and perhaps intentionally improves their competitive position by insulating them
from competition by out-of-state integrated producers and refiners.").
544. Id. at 147.
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to see a response in kind, inaugurating the very cycle of discrimina-
tion and retaliation that the DCCD should forestall.
CONCLUSION
The decision rules model of constitutional interpretation is a
particularly helpful lens through which to examine the past and
future of the DCCD. Not only does it explain the Court's er-
ratic-almost capricious--development of the doctrine, it also
provides insight into the reason the rules the Court created always
failed. Failure to connect rules with constitutional commands made
the conflation of rules with commands inevitable.
That cycle appears to be repeating itself with the DCCD's
contemporary doctrine, and the Court seems poised to alter its
decision rules once again. Instead of proceeding in an ad hoc
manner, as it has done in the past and seems inclined to repeat, I
have argued here that the Court should explicitly establish a
constitutional command rooted in text and history, then lay down
rules that enforce that command. I have argued, contrary to critics,
that a constitutional basis for the DCCD can be found; that it
roughly approximates the current "antidiscrimination rule," but
that the rule itself needs to be defined more narrowly, lest the rule
be mistaken for the explicit command-a command often misunder-
stood as a constitutional imperative for free trade simpliciter.
Further, the Court, I have argued, should explicitly abandon
"balancing" as part of the DCCD, a step it appears to have already
taken sub silentio.
It is obviously impossible to hypothesize the full range of factual
situations to which the decision rules model I propose would have
to apply. The model would, if adopted by the Court, have to evolve.
It would also be as susceptible to calcification as any doctrinal
regime. Nevertheless, my aim here has not been to utter the final
word on the DCCD, but rather to look at the problems of the DCCD
and propose solutions that track what the Court seems to hint at in
its decisions, and that can find firm footing in the text and history
of the Constitution. I will count my effort successful if I move
someone to argue that I have erred in either the diagnosis or the
prescriptions.
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